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Abstract

Cybersecurity for power communication infrastructure is a serious subject that has
been discussed for a decade since the first North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) critical infrastructure protection (CIP) initiative in 2006. Its credibility on plausibility has been evidenced by attack events in the recent past. Although
this is a “very high impact, rare probability” event, the establishment of quantitative
measures would help asset owners in making a series of investment decisions.

First, this dissertation tackles attackers’ strategies based on the current communication architecture between remote IP-based (unmanned) power substations and energy control centers. Hypothetically, the identification of intrusion paths will lead
to the worst-case scenarios that the attackers could do harm to the grid, e.g., how
this switching attack may perturb to future cascading outages within a control area
when an IP-based substation is compromised. Systematic approaches are proposed
in this dissertation on how to systematically determine pivotal substations and how
investment can be prioritized to maintain and appropriate a reasonable investment
in protecting their existing cyberinfrastructure.

More specifically, the second essay of this dissertation focuses on digital protecting
relaying, which could have similar detrimental effects on the overall grid’s stability.

xxi

The R̂ − k contingency analyses are proposed to verify with steady-state and dynamic
simulations to ensure consistencies of simulation outcome in the proposed modeling
in a power system. This is under the assumption that attackers are able to enumerate
all electronic devices and computers within a compromised substation network. The
essay also assists stakeholders (the defenders) in planning out exhaustively to identify
the critical digital relays to be deployed in substations. The systematic methods are
the combinatorial evaluation to incorporate the simulated statistics in the proposed
metrics that are used based on the physics and simulation studies using existing power
system tools.

Finally, a risk transfer mechanism of cyber insurance against disruptive switching attacks is studied comprehensively based on the aforementioned two attackers’ tactics.
The evaluation hypothetically assesses the occurrence of anomalies and how these
footprints of attackers can lead to a potential cascading blackout as well as to restore
the power back to normal stage. The research proposes a framework of cyber insurance premium calculation based on the ruin probability theory, by modeling potential
electronic intrusion and its direct impacts. This preliminary actuarial model can further improve the security of the protective parameters of the critical infrastructure
via incentivizing investment in security technologies.

xxii

Chapter 1

Introduction

Stratagems of attackers have gradually advanced with highly sophisticated domain
knowledge. The evolution of intelligent attack agents in cyberspace is evident by the
public disclosure of recent events [2, 3, 4]. There was estimated statistically more
than 160 break-ins reported by U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) between years of
2010 and 2014 [5]. Among them, 10 of them are discovered in the operational environment. National Nuclear Security Administration, a quasi-autonomous agency within
DOE, reported 19 successful cyber-based infiltrations over those 4 years [5]. The rise
of cyber threats in the near horizon has become the critical issues in system planning
[6]. It was reported that the “WannaCry” attack is probably the worst ransomware
thus far, which affected over 200,000 people across over 150 countries and cost 1.5

1

billion dollars lost in the year of 2016 [7]. On December 24, 2015, the first-ever cyberattack on the Ukraine power grid caused 225,000 people to lose power for more than
6 hours [8, 9, 10]. Although the cyberattack shows the credibility of security threats,
the forensic team continues to investigate by piecing evidence together for a study
of event reconstruction with potential mitigation strategies [11]. Potential cyber vulnerabilities of the power grid could be adversely manipulated by attackers, which
may significantly threaten the system stability operated by power utilities. The bidirectional remote access between substations and control center as well as protection
limitation across the boundary firewalls leave loopholes for attackers to sneak in when
the configuration rules are weakly enforced [12]. Addressing integrated cyber-physical
system (CPS) security in the control environment has become a pressing issue due
to the exposure of power automation between the computerized control management
system and the switchgear in power substations. This work proposes a risk-based
assessment model by formulating the hypothesized substation outages, with overload
implications, and extending to investigate the contingency with compromised digital
relays. The cyber risk management framework is also discussed with the introduction
of the cyber insurance premium.

2

1.1

Extended Enumerations of Hypothesized Substation Outages

The emergence of IP-based solutions in power automation has revolutionized industrial control systems. The cybersecurity of a power infrastructure relies on the technologically enhanced communication infrastructure to synthesize geographically dispersed substation information [13]. Most substations are upgraded with IP-based
solutions, integrating with microprocessor-based protective relays as well as connecting to high traffic network between control centers and substations [13, 14]. The
lack of auditing on remote substations and security protection can be the loophole
as a backdoor for attackers. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation
(NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) compliance has now included more
concrete clauses with possible technologies in the documents for improving protection implementation [15]. In addition, the presidential policy directive (PPD) 21
and executive order (EO) 13636 has enumerated the roles and responsibilities of the
Department of Homeland Security [16].

In the parallel effort to compliance policies, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)’s preliminary cybersecurity framework has envisioned five major components of the best practice to (1) identify, (2) protect, (3) detect, (4) respond, and

3

(5) recover [17]. Identification is the first step of all where organizations should determine deficiencies of security protection. However, ongoing efforts committed to
the procedural compliance in security planning may not directly thwart the attack
possibilities with potential security technologies in the substation control system.

Remote access to unmanned substation networks provides a convenient way to maintain the system by directly connecting from the authorized computers to the site.
This is a security concern as the majority of security protection in substations are often deployed with commercial-grade firewalls. These are the routers with limitations
that can be subject to intrusion if the whitelisting of firewalls is not properly maintained and audited. Generally, attackers plot for a cyberattack when they successfully
intrude to a network. There are the attacks that may mislead operators that do not
immediately affect the operation such as false injection [18, 19]. However, disruptive
switching attacks can implicate operation that can be catastrophic. In 2013, NERC
conducted hypothetically a drill exercise that would plunge millions of Americans into
darkness. A year later, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) disclosed
a combination of 9 key substations would be sufficient for such kind of widespread
outage [20, 21]. This is one of the many combination cases that can have cascading
consequences to the grid. Intrusion-based switching attacks affect substation reliability and can lead to cascading failure due to protective relaying within the network
that can weaken system operating conditions [22, 23, 24].

4

With the aforementioned issues and significant development in recent years, the power
grid has undergone a substantial upgrade with renewable sources and advanced communication infrastructure [25, 26]. This new normal has been anticipated with extreme threats such as natural disaster or cyberterrorism. The traditionally established
N-1 contingency analysis shall be revisited to study the root cause effect. Research in
the area of contingency extremism has been further investigated [25, 27, 28]. However,
these approaches do not include the incurring failure effect in the CPS security-related
contingencies that captures the potential cascades under abnormal operating circumstances. A causal inference framework, based on anomaly correlation, is prototyped
to detect malicious activities by synthesizing cyber- and power-related sensor information [29]. The reversed pyramid model (RPM) has shown the promise of effective
elimination of combinatorial worst cases [25, 30]. However, the proposed method is
limited by the enumerative methods that may not explore the solution space with
the segmentation approach, which may contain certain combinations with potential
uncertainties that can lead to system-wide instability.

An enumerative framework is needed to evaluate the criticality of any combination.
Table 1.1 specifies the differences between the solution spaces of weather-related and
cyber-induced contingency analysis. It can be observed from the table that the
weather-related contingency analysis usually is studied with a low level of the order, i.e., N-1 is the most common enumeration of presumed electrical faults. The
contingency of N-2 is less likely to occur with multiple locations concurrently and so
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as the higher order of N-k contingencies where it is often to model a double-circuit line
under the same tower [31, 32]. The number of contingency selection is often based on
a specific combination of the component outage which is based on the organizational
practice in planning.
Table 1.1
Comparison of combination spaces between N-1, N-2, N-k, and sum of S-k
contingency analysis

Contingency
Weather-related
Cyber-induced

50-substation system
Single-element failure (N-1)
Double-element failure (N-2)
Multiple-element failure (N-k)
Exhaustive enumeration(∑ S-k)

Solution Space
50
1225
≅ 108
≅ 1015

The objective of this part of the research is to identify the pivotal substations by
establishing enhanced metrics to quantify the cyber risks of a power system, which
exhaustively enumerates all the possibilities. The approach we employ here is the
combinations of IP-based substations that are connected with the lines, transformers, and generators. We assume that firewalls have limitations and so cyberintrusion
can occur at any IP-based substations to be executed by attackers to disconnect
lines, loads, and generators using the compromised substation control networks. This
enumeration is a combinatorial problem where defenders would need to identify exhaustively the IP-based substations and hypothesized substation outages that can be
detrimental to the power grid operation [1]. The major contribution of this work is
to re-establish the cyber-based contingency approach to extensively enumerate (sum
of S-k contingencies) by incorporating the overloaded lines based on a hypothesized
outages of the substations. For the improvements of cyber-situation awareness, the
6

combinatorial model is two-fold: First, all worst-case scenarios are enumerated with
an increase of k from 1 to S ′ . Then, each converged case is re-evaluated with the
incurring lines that are electrically disconnected due to overloads.

1.2

Switching Attack through Compromised Relays

Technology in relays has evolved and has been transformed into full automation.
Most substations have been gradually upgraded with the integration of the digital
protective relays and IP-based solutions. These relays are the intelligent electronic
devices (IEDs) that are part of the IEC61850 framework for substation automation
[14, 33, 34]. Today, an average of medium-sized substations is deployed at about
50 protective IEDs. In most cases, the passwords are set up and maintained for
those IEDs in substations. The sophistication of password management may also
introduce inconvenience for maintenance where these tens of thousands of protective
IEDs can be poorly managed. Each intentional trip manipulated by attackers can
initiate detrimental effects. This cyber-physical tie must be studied carefully in order
to understand associated risks and the attack implication [35, 36].

The cybersecurity of the power grid has been an emerging issue that is closely related
to the reliability of the system. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation
7

(NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) compliance has introduced concrete
standards for improvement of the cybersecurity level of power infrastructure [20, 37].
The French National Cybersecurity Agency (ANSSI) [38, 39] details the classification of the security measures in Industrial Control System (ICS) and specifies the
vulnerabilities contained in the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
network and the potential risks behind the operator behaviors. Additionally, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has published a preliminary
cybersecurity framework with five major components [17] and introduced that the
risk-based cybersecurity framework would be a benefit for cooperation between the
customers, utilities, and vendors because an intensive discussion on the cybersecurity
issue is required [40]. Recently, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
has issued an incident-report standard to strengthen the cybersecurity of the power
grids [41].

In order to improve the risk-based assessment model, it is necessary to take the
compromised IEDs into consideration in terms of the detrimental effects on the power
system stability [42]. Additionally, as a defender, we might not be able to predict
the attackers’ motives but we could identify the critical protective IEDs which might
lead to more devastating results than just disconnect electronically a substation, for
example, if the protective relay is directly connecting to the switch of the load or
generation unit, a suddenly disruptive change on the load and generation would cause
steady-state instabilities and in worst case, transient-stability discussion is needed.

8

Additionally, when considering the influences of the diversity of the protective IEDs,
several protective IEDs may cover the same protective zone and have similar events if
compromised, which will also increase the difficulty of quantifying the effects for each
IEDs. In terms of the combination complexity, compared with substation contingency
S-k, an extensive evaluation of the protective IEDs would generate extremely large
combination pool at 10 with the power of 30-100, which depends on the size of the
studied case and number of protective IEDs that installed in each bus.

Despite technology introduced anomalies, the physics of the power grid with relaying
remains, i.e., cascading will occur even if the initial cause of events has changed [43].
To quantify the potential cyber-based impact, the risk-based assessment towards the
hypothesized substation outages have been studied in previous papers [26, 28, 29, 44]
and a quantitative framework for determination of the criticality of each electrical
component has been proposed in [1, 25, 45, 46]. Survey paper [1] categorizes the proposed framework into three main aspects: (1) critical/non-critical combination verification, (2) cascade confirmation and (3) combination re-evaluations with dynamic
analysis. An extended enumerative framework is required to identify the worst-case
scenario, which is an S-select-k enumeration. The extended evaluations of hypothesized substation outages are more complicated [1].

Defenders might not be able to predict the behavior of attackers and their strategies;
however, defenders can plan exhaustively to identify the critical protective IEDs which
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might initiate catastrophic consequence of a grid [47, 48]. The proposed method is
to define the cyber-physical relay switching attack as the R-select-k problem, which
verifies the simulation results on both the time-domain dynamic simulation and power
flow analysis for the IED modeling. The cascading effect is studied to determine
practical adaptability. The time-domain dynamic simulation model is implemented
to check the consistency of the results between the power flow and tripping implication
initiated by the plausible switching attacks through digital relays.

1.3

Cyber Insurance Framework

Insurance is a promising risk transfer tool against disruptive cyberattacks on power
grids. Cyber insurance is proposed to cover the economic loss and liabilities due to
the malicious cyberattack, which would incentivize utility owners to optimize their
investment spending based on protective parameters and indirect benefits [49, 50, 51].
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) has included stakeholders to work on the critical topics of risk
management in security [52], which would help to improve the security posture in
terms of (1) promoting the adoption of preventative measures; and (2) encouraging
the integration of the best practice of self-protection based on their existing network
architectures. Insurance, as a feasible method of risk transfer, is an in-developing
stratagem, but still has attracted large attention from researchers in various fields
10

[53, 54]. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) compliance has now published more clauses in order
to implement necessary technologies for improving the cybersecurity of the control
networks [15, 19, 20, 32]. Additionally, the recorded frequent attempts of intrusions
into critical infrastructure networks reveal the cyber threats that the U.S power grid
confronts now and the urgent need for improving cybersecurity [16, 17].

It is suggested that an internal failure of the information system can be modeled in a
general insurance market with residual risk classification associated with security [55,
56]. The potential risk of vulnerable parameters is also identified using the provided
framework in [56]. From the perspective of network security, stochastic processes
have been employed to model the pricing based on security risks of information and
communication technology (ICT) using the network topology [54]. However, security
at the user level should be also incorporated as an integral part of the overall security
modeling [57, 58]. The interdependency between the attackers’ behavior and system
architectures play an important role in this cyber insurance formulation in which it
may generally lead to the competitiveness among insurers that would probably not be
helpful for improving overall enterprise security. However, by integrating the physical
impacts and mitigation strategies for a power grid with the cyber aspects, pricing for
insurance premium can be accurately estimated [59].

The cyber insurance market for power grids remains in an emerging stage and it
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is yet to mature. This new business opportunity is distinctive as compared to the
traditional insurance mainly due to the lack of historical loss data [60, 61]. Another
challenge is information asymmetry. As the insurance business in cybersecurity is not
yet mandatory for power utilities, insurers would first need to establish a quantitative
framework with the details of cyber-physical event replays to intertwine the potential
cascading consequence of all possible outcomes in the premium calculation.

NERC CIP does not provide standardized metrics for quantifying residual risks associated with electronic intrusion to control networks. Most asset owners have their
own way to secure their control networks [62]. However, if insurance companies can
harness the digital evidence from the cyber systems and hypothetically enumerate
some nightmare scenarios to replay the cascading outcomes, it would help to mature
this emerging market. The risk theory can provide the quintessential basis for most
insurance models and problems [63]. Estimating risks can be calculated using the
ruin probability from the direct calculation method, which is known to be the basic
risk model [63, 64, 65, 66].

This part of research proposes a framework for grid insurance against disruptive
switching attacks, which is assumed to be determined by two major aspects: (1)
the probability of successful intrusion into the substation(s) which will presumably
result in disruptive switching attack from the compromised substation(s) and (2) the
discrete distribution of claim size of each potential attack scenario [64, 65, 66]. The
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vulnerability and the steady-state probability of potential electronic intrusion to each
power substation have been studied in the papers [67, 68], which are derived from the
firewall and password models using Markov chain. The steady-state probability [67]
is assumed to be effective to generate the discrete distribution of the hypothesized
scenario.

The organization of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 summarizes the literature surveys on the cyber-related contingencies of the power system. Chapter 3 introduces the risk-based assessment model with both hypothesized substation outages
and switching attack through digital relays. Chapter 4 introduces a risk-management
framework of cyber insurance premium calculation by modeling potential electronic
intrusion and its direct impacts. Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation.
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Chapter 2

Risk Evaluations and Management
of Cyberattacks on Power Grid

2.1

Introduction

The power grid has now emerged into one of the largest, most complex systems of human invention in all of history, involving tremendous communication bandwidth for
the interactions between cyberinfrastructure and physical systems. SCADA systems
are an essential part of power communication infrastructures and play a central role
in ensuring effective operations of bulk power systems. SCADA systems have helped
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to achieve new levels of system reliability and meet improved power quality requirements, especially when distributed energy systems have been incorporated in the grid
[69, 70]. The use of IP-based communication frameworks though, has brought about
concerns over cybersecurity issues. As a result, the operational reliability of a power
grid requires new methodological developments to align reliability goals with emerging risks of new communications technologies [71, 72, 73, 74]. Currently there are no
comprehensive techniques and tools available to model and evaluate the hypothetical
impacts of cyberattacks. The abrupt disruption or disconnections of nodes corresponding to load and generation can result in detrimental effects to the power grid.
A US Government report published in 2007 reported several incidents of cybersecurity
penetration in control system of different critical infrastructure [75].

2.2

Power Control Center Framework

Power infrastructure communication is integral to a nation’s critical infrastructure
[76]. As early as the 1980s, the revolution of information communication technology (ICT) for power grid operation started changing how critical infrastructures are
managed [77]. As shown in the Fig. 2.1, ICT consists of generation local area network (LAN), transmission LAN and wide area network (WAN), distribution LAN and
WAN, distributed generation LAN and WAN and Customer LAN networks. Different LANs are connected through public communication networks that are generally
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Figure 2.1: Generalized wide-area SCADA network connectivity between
generation, transmission, and distribution systems of a power interconnection

managed by telecommunication companies. There are often three hierarchical control centers: (1) a national control center, (2) regional control centers, and (3) local
control centers. Each local control center collects real-time data from physical systems of substations and transmits that data to regional control center after processing
the data. Distribution Control Centers manage local control centers for the largest
substations in the distribution system. The Ukraine cyberattack compromised the
distribution control center as highlighted with a red box in Fig. 2.1. This would
impact significantly the overall grid operation in a global sense of potential cascading in case of generation-load mismatch. Regional Control Centers are associated
with managing high-voltage transmission lines and have supervisory control of all
local control centers in that particular region. Regional control centers act as middleman between local control centers, distribution control centers and national control
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centers. Regional control centers mainly control transmission substations. National
control centers play a vital role in power system operation and controls. Such centers
control the extra high voltage (EHV) transmission system, coordinate the activities
of regional control centers, and are responsible for overall power system reliability and
stability. National control centers collect real-time data from regional control centers
and perform the function of EMS, state estimator and central network management
of the overall power system [78]. Studies by the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC) have shown that a simulated cyberattack drill demonstrates an
absolute possibility to bring down the US power grids [79].

2.3

Past, Current, and Future Applications of
Contingencies

The power grid is designed to withstand a single component outage (N-1 contingency),
ensuring that operating limits are not violated by such outages [20, 80]. Power system reliability evaluation includes the integration of individual substation operating
states and contingencies which are measured in terms of power frequency and duration of substation equipment outage events. Failure criteria for substations and
violation thresholds of system reliability are defined based on substation size, location and functionality within the system [81, 82]. Literature review shows that there
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have been a number of blackouts caused by cascading failures of transmission lines
and generating units in recent years throughout the world [83]. If a substation is deenergized, the change in power flow is compensated by other substations, which must
have enough spare capacity to carry the excess power. If they do not, transmission
lines and transformers of those substations will be overloaded and overcurrent protection will trip those components to avoid thermal damage. This event will initiate
a cascading failure as the excess power is switched onto neighboring circuits, which
may also be running at or near their maximum capacity [84]. A probabilistic model
can be used to estimate the cascading outages in high-voltage transmission network
[85] and online dynamic security assessment in an EMS environment [86].

2.3.1

Single Contingency

Power system security is referred to the contingency analysis where an N-select-1 list
of components is hypothesized as taken out of service to determine whether any such
state results in a violation of voltage or power flow limits in a power grid [87]. In
the 1970’s, the traditional approach of steady-state contingency analysis is to test all
contingencies, such as transmission line outage and loss of generation, that are predefined by system planner/operators experience and intuition [88]. Inadequacies of this
traditional approach were later addressed and new techniques proposed to perform
exhaustive testing, including both primary and secondary contingencies. Contingency
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screening for fast realtime contingency analysis was proposed using modification of
fast decoupled power flow algorithm [89]. An efficient contingency analysis method
has been implemented to detect of flow violation for transmission lines[90].

2.3.2

Multiple Contingencies

To evaluate the contingency severity of removing any combination of substations
from the system, an AC load flow method might be used [91]. Multiple contingency
is seen to have largely prepared reliable systems to survive disasters [92, 93]. In North
America, FERC has clarified that the list of the contingencies to be used in performing
system operation and planning studies should include all the contingencies, N-1, N1-1, N-2, as well as multiple contingencies [94]. As required by NERC reliability
standards, the power system after a contingency should return to a secure, reliable
state within 30 minutes [95].

Multiple contingencies have been researched since the late 1970s [88]. Since then,
the main effort of such research is to reduce the computation burden caused by the
tremendous number of contingency cases in bulk power system: the total number of
N-k contingency cases is N !/[k!(N − k)]. Various screening and ranking techniques
based on the theoretical approach and parallel computing techniques based on the
simulation-based approach have been proposed and developed in the past five decades.
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Conventional approaches related to the screening and ranking of contingencies are illustrated in [96, 97, 98, 99, 100]. After contingency studies for transmission planning
were regulated by NERC in 2005 [95], research relevant to the NERC compliance study
have accelerated and the techniques for searching for critical/credible contingencies
which consists of N-2 contingencies and N-1-1 contingencies have been developed in
industry as well as academia [95, 101]. Most of the approaches described by academia
are based on network topology analysis [101, 102] and nonlinear optimization heuristics in terms of power planning perspectives. Because multiple contingencies could
lead to cascading failures, multiple contingencies have also been studied in terms of
wide area monitoring and protection with sensors such as PMUs in the wake of widespread blackouts affecting North America and Europe in 2003, 2004, and 2006. Since
then, multiple contingencies and consecutive large blackouts have been a frequently
discussed topic in industry. Information about past blackouts have been shared by industries and academia all over the world every two years during CIGRE Paris session
since 2006 [103, 104, 105, 106, 107].

2.3.3

Cyber-Related Contingencies

As IP-based communications infrastructure is the trend for future deployments, expecting only N-1 contingencies is no longer be meaningful for both security analysts
and power engineers [80]. As shown in the Fig. 2.2, a coordinated attack associated
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with compromised substations enables attackers to trip multiple generators, transmission lines, loads, or transformers nearly-simultaneously in a power grid, impairing
system operating conditions. A more structured, integrated framework with high
redundancy and defense mechanisms is required to face the challenges of intelligent
coordinated cyberattacks, which can severely impact system operations [108]. Violation of predefined thresholds of substation voltages, system frequency, and branch
flows may lead to cascading failure and a system blackout [109].

As system loading levels vary over time, the criticality of each substation (node) can
be different at different times [110]. An approach to hypothesize multiple substation
outages is proposed to presume that a set of combinations of IP-based substations
are compromised by intruders and are electronically manipulated to abruptly isolate
substations from the grid with disruptive switching actions [111, 112]. Combinatorial
substation outages are the cyber-contingency analysis that enumerates the worstcase scenarios. Since the solution space of the sum of S-select-k problem can be
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extremely large, a systematic elimination approach using power flow modules is used
to validate each combination in order to capture the worst combinations [25, 30,
111, 112]. This process eliminates insignificant combinations, enumerating from the
first-level substation list of the RPM. While this approach may not be exhaustively
enumerated; it can be further enhanced with prioritization of substation selection
criteria. This contingency analysis is based on the relationship between substation
critical cyber systems that have direct interaction with the physical power grid, i.e.,
the cyber assets that would have control capability to disconnect local components
from the grid. Based on the conclusion of previous work [111, 112], manipulation of
microprocessorbased relays on bus differential protection would have a detrimental
effect, able to disconnect large numbers of components from the system. At minimum,
hypothesized cyber attacks would occur at multiple substations, as attackers would
be able to intrude to the S number of IP-based substations. Under this assumption,
at least one or more substation outages would occur, depending on the number of
substations that have been compromised [30, 111, 112].

Preliminary investigation on system reliability and its resulting impacts have shown
the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm with quantitative analysis on penetrated
protective IED relays [113]. A small number of approaches exist to find critical substation combinations or collapse sequence of cascading failures, but none are in online
environments, and all are applicable only to restricted numbers of combinations of
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substations [91]. Since the event of simultaneous cyberattacks on 3 or more substations is rare, the worst case will be considered. Priority list 2 only evaluates the
impact by de-energizing more than two substations that result in the impact factor
of 1.0 and serves as a message to control centers [114]. Cyber-based contingency
analysis is a fundamentally new way to assess the system stability by considering all
plausible attack vectors. These attack vectors can be any combination of these: (i)
distributed denial of service (DDoS) [115, 116, 117],(ii)alter and hide (AaH) [118],
(iii) data integrity [119, 120], (iv) load altering [121], (v) disruptive switching [116].

2.3.4

Dynamics of Intelligent Cyberattack

The existing major entities of bulk power systems have been upgraded with IP-based
communication infrastructure over the past decades. The manipulation using a compromised local control system can impair system operation due to the potential impacts on the physical system. The triggers of system dynamics, such as disconnections
or abrupt shutdown of important elements within a power grid, can implicate the possibilities of system stability.

One of the worst-case scenarios is a widespread cascading failure that will lead to
a power blackout costing tens or hundreds of billions of the dollars to an economy
as large as that of the USA. The importance of considering power system dynamics
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for cybersecurity issues has already been recognized. Power system dynamics can be
significantly affected by network communication and control system infrastructure
including generator controllers and protective relays. The establishment of a mathematical formulation for representing power system dynamics is a non-trivial task.
Controllers and protections include non-linear behavior and discrete changes. In addition, any formulation must account for many interactions. There can be interaction
between controllers and interaction between protection equipment. There can be interactions between controllers and protection, between controller and the grid, and
between protection and the grid. This sub-chapter focuses on the review of the recent
studies that are relevant to power system dynamics.

The recent research studies can be categorized as focused on either (1) Abnormal
power system dynamic phenomena, or (2) Measurement of implementing cyberphysical security systems. Typically, an abnormal behavior of power system dynamics
is classified into four phenomena that can result in a widespread power outage: voltage stability, frequency stability, transient stability and overload. The latest research
studies cover the first three abnormal phenomena.

2.3.4.1

Transient Stability

Transient stability is examined using the undesired control of the semi-conductorbased reactive power compensators such as static var compensator (SVC) and static
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synchronous compensator (STATCOM). References [115, 122, 123] exhibit the possibility of being out-of-step due to biased or delayed operation of SVC or STATCOM.
The fundamental idea is to represent the same dynamic behavior, even when the
improper control parameters are tuned. Modification attack is assumed to be responsible for the undesired control. This vulnerability is relevant only when a system fault
occurs near the reactive power compensator.

2.3.4.2

Frequency Stability

Frequency stability is examined using undesired control of Automatic Generation
Control (AGC) or falsified load change data. Because falsified load changes have
the same effect as an undesired control signal of AGC, the two attack scenarios
can be treated as the same one. References [119, 124] exhibit the possibility of
frequency collapse which results in significant frequency change, such as 3 Hz or
more. The fundamental idea is to represent the same dynamic behavior when the
wrong/improper control parameters of AGC are tuned. Data integrity attacks are
assumed for the undesired control and the falsified load changes. The sudden loss of
generation/loads can also cause frequency instability [116, 117].
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2.3.4.3

Short-Term Voltage Stability

Short-term voltage stability is examined using the undesired control of stepwise
change in active or reactive power outputs. Reference [120] exhibits the possibility of short-term voltage collapse which is caused by a significant voltage drop. The
fundamental idea is to change active or reactive power output in order to generate a
growing power swing oscillation and/or to have a shortage of reactive power support
in the whole grid. In this study, transient stability problems seem to occur when a
voltage collapse occurs. In the case of large networks, the short-term voltage collapse
in entire power system could lead to an outof-step condition in the entire network.
Short-term voltage response is also examined using the non-operation of primary relay or unwanted operation of the back-up relay. Reference [120] also exhibits the
possibility of large voltage excursion. The fundamental idea is to enlarge the impact
of the fault via nonoperation of the primary protection or the unwanted operation of
the back-up protection. However, the goal of the paper [1] does not represent blackouts, but to establish a complex cyberphysical system. Similar study includes using
the undesired control of SVC caused by man-in-the-middle attack [125].
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2.3.4.4

Slow Dynamics

Long-term dynamics is considered using the arbitrary load change by jamming the
pricing signal in the electricity market. References [121, 126] studies the possibilities of unwanted slow dynamics caused by the delayed and distorted data-centric
attack, which eventually causes the degradation of the controller performance and
the negative impact on any kind of the power system stability. Smart meters in electrical distribution network which utilize wireless communication such as WiMAX is
assumed to be used for this scenario and the jamming attack is applied to the electricity market in order to jam the power price signaling over a large area such as the
load center. Such manipulation of the electricity market via the data-centric attack
(or the false data injection attack) can bring the attacker to the profit and cause the
significant impact on the stability of the power system.

2.4

Insurance Implications of Contingencies

Many research organizations and institutes are seeking for insurance model that would
respond to cyberattack, which is believed to be an under-insured risk [60]. Financial and insurance incentives are believed to be another effective method to improve
the security and resilience of the grid [59]. Understanding the impact of the severe
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cyberattack event is particularly significant to develop insurance solutions. Though,
currently, the insurance plays a limited role electricity area, in general, the insurance
would be designed to reduce the liability or prevent catastrophic damage from cyberattack. Most large utilities have participated in a large mutual risk pool called
Associate Electric & Gas Insurance Services Limited (AEGIS), which is an insurance company that has included entire energy infrastructure in North America and
provides liability, property coverage, and related risk management services.

Cyber insurance is relatively new type of insurance that covers a broader range of
issues related to cyber risk, which presents several challenges [59]: (1) Cyber risk is
hard to measure, model, and price due to lack of actuarial data. (2) The consequences
and the probability are hard to measure. (3) It is hard to assess the liability and
risk when a cloud or third-party service provider is included. (4) “Cyber risk is a
dynamic, evolving threat, which is not constrained by the conventional boundaries
of geography, jurisdiction or physical laws.” Additionally, the cyber insurer is also
required to consider different types of coverage, including power generation company,
utilities, companies losing power, and homeowners. Despite these challenges, the
cyber insurance is a promising method to help to improve the cybersecurity and
resilience of the power grid.
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Chapter 3

Cyber-Risk Assessment Model

3.1

Introduction

The cyber risk assessment framework is introduced in this chapter with evaluations
of the system instabilities in terms of the physical impacts that are caused by the
cyber manipulations. The contingency planning study would include the “what if” attack scenarios that would disconnect compromised substation(s)/component(s) from
the system, which would normally includes multiple N-k contingencies. The risk assessment model is validated using both the steady-state and dynamic methods with
implications of the enumerative combinations.

The hypothesized substation outages are conducted in the chapter through evaluating
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the risk of cascading outages, which is also associated with overloading consequences.
As a result of electrical short circuits, protective relaying picks up the faults and
electrically disconnects overloaded transmission lines through circuit breakers. With
similar disturbance and implication, disruptive switching cyberattacks in one or more
compromised substations can initiate such events that will aggravate system’s operating conditions, leading to a widespread blackout. This chapter applies an extended
enumeration of substation outages that excludes the overloaded lines from a power
flow model, which is denoted as S-k contigency. First, the exhaustive combination
which starts from the initial combination size k = 1 is enumerated searching for nonconvergent solutions of the hypothesized contingencies associated with the outages
of single or more substations. Once the critical substations are compromised, attack
agents can coordinate among their peers to plot for maximizing disruption using local
control devices.

Defenders might not be able to predict the behavior of attackers and their strategies; however, defenders can plan exhaustively to identify the critical protective IEDs
which might initiate catastrophic consequence of a grid [47, 48]. It is also critical to
enumerate and identify all digital relays to determine the systemic risks. Any combination of disruptive switching via the compromised relays can result in misoperation
or immediate effect to the system. The resulting consequence of these attack’s initial
events would possibly incur cascading failure to a grid. This work also defines the
cyber-physical relay switching attack as R-k contingency, which verifies the simulation
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results on both the time-domain dynamic simulation and power flow analysis for the
IED modeling. The cascading effect is studied to determine practical adaptability.
The time-domain dynamic simulation model is implemented to check the consistency
of the results between power flow and tripping implication initiated by the plausible
switching attacks through digital relays.

Chapter 3.2 provides the modeling details of cyber-based substation outages with
overloading implications. Chapter 3.3 introduces a linearized method to the modify
the S-k model incorporating islanding issue. Chapter 3.4 introduces a probabilitybased framework to evaluate the potential impact of the outages of protective relays.
Chapter 3.5 extends the R-k model by incorporating the static and dynamic validation. Chapter 3.6 presents the simulation results.

3.2

Extended Enumeration on Hypothesized Substation Outages

The purpose of this chapter is to re-establish the cyberbased contingency approach
to extensively enumerate (sum of S-k contingencies) by incorporating the overloaded
lines based on a hypothesized outages of the substations, using RPM method. For
the improvements of cyber-situation awareness, the combinatorial model is two-fold:
First, all worst case scenarios are enumerated with an increase of k from 1 to S ′ .
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Then, each converged case is re-evaluated with the incurring lines that are electrically
disconnected due to overloads.

3.2.1

Modeling of Hypothesized Nodal Outages

In this formulation, the initiating events are the disruptive switching cyberattack on
those compromised IP-based substations that initiate cascading effect and disconnect
sequential overloaded components, such as lines, transformers, or generators from a
power system. Like many blackout events occurred in the past, line outages are often
caused by the initial outage that can be modeled by overloaded lines. Generally, the
protective relays will disconnect electrically those overloaded components when an
electrical fault is detected between two substations based on pre-defined protection
schemes.

The hypothesized nodal outage here is referred to any plausible cyberattack events
associated with IP-based substations. This section is divided into two: (A) Extended
enumerative approach and (B) Determination of nonconvergent power flow.
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(a) Initial topology of a substation
under attack G(V,E)



(b) Overloaded line incurred from
the switching attack G’(V’,E’)







(c) Cascading line outage under
the same attack scenario G’’(V’,E’’)

Figure 3.1: Graph representation for a hypothesized substation outage G′
and its cascading outage G′′

3.2.1.1

Extended Enumerative Approach

G(V, E) ÐÐÐÐÐÐ→ V ′ (G′ ) = V (G) ∖ Vk ⊂ Ssub ÐÐÐÐÐ→ E ′ (G′′ ) = E(G′ ) ∖ Ek ⊂ L
´¹¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¸ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¶ cyberattack ´¹¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¸¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹¶ overloading ´¹¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¸¹¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¶
Switching

(a) Original G

Potential

(b) Hypothesized substations outages

(c) Overloading outages

Ô⇒ E ′ (G′′ ) = E(G′ ) ∖ Ek ⊂ L ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→ PFf ailed
´¹¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¸¹¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¶ power flow status
Determine

(3.1)

(c) Overloading outages

A steady-state analysis using power flow module is employed to verify the overloading
effect that characterizes the sequential outages by excluding those from the power flow
model. To explicitly describe the topology statuses before a plausible cyberattack
event, we represent a power system as a graph G(V, E) depicted in Fig. 3.1(a). The
graph consists of vertex set V and edge set E that corresponds to each of those as
substations and transmission lines, respectively. Equation (3.1) describes generally
the topology statuses for each transition of Fig. 3.1 in a graph where Ssub is a
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set of total IP-based substations of the total number of substations ST otal , such as
Ssub ⊆ ST otal . This implies that not all substations are IP-based but all substations
can be upgraded with IP-based communication infrastructure in the future. The L is
a set of total transmission lines associated with all substations ST otal . The prime (′ )
and double prime (′′ ) represent an updated topology status of each transition from
the causing to the incurring perspectives, i.e., parts (a)–(c). The motivation here is
to determine if the power flow fails to converge PFf ailed = 1 for the combinatorial
study of a power system under certain operating conditions.

The total number of combinations from k = 1 to the S ′ -th level is enumerated as
′

S′ = ∑Sk=1 CSk [25], where S is the total number of IP-based substations in a power
system, and k is a pointer of each k level as it increases closer to total number
of substations S . The S ′ value introduced in this work is the depth level that is
smaller than the total number of IP-based substations. The S′ is the sum of total
combinations for each level before level S. Fig. 3.2 shows the enumeration from k = 1
to S ′ with the demonstration of decreasing ratio ψ(⋅). As depicted on the left side of
the figure, a substation outage (k = 1) is presumed. As the level k increases, so as the
combinatorial complexity when more substations “goes south.” Each level, it consists
of two parts, i.e., ψ is denoted by the ratio of new reduced combination, the other
′

part 1 − ψ is the ratio of reduced combinations and CSk ⋅ (1 − ψ) is a total combination
to be reduced at the level of S ′ . To describe the cases between levels, the following
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Figure 3.2: Enumeration from k = 1 to S ′ with decreasing ratio ψ(⋅)

are generalized.
⎧
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⎪
⎪
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⎪
⎪
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⎪
CS
⎪
1
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
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⎪
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⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
snew,k
s
⎪
⎪
< new,k−1
< 1.0, k ≥ 3
⎪
CS
CS
⎪
k−1
⎩ k

(3.2)

At level one, the ratio of new reduced combination ψ dominates by 1.0. In the
contrary, at the last level k = S, the 1 − ψ will be 1.0. These ratios are the reflection of
effective reduction of enumerated combinations at each level. Without eliminations
from the previous level, the total combination of S-select-k will increase as k grows.
Some nonconvergent combinations from the previous level will not carry on to the
current level as these combinations can be the subsets of the new total combination
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at the new level k = k + 1. The proposed ratios measure new reduced combinations
for each level before power flow verification. For example, in the IEEE-39 case, 1,868
out of 888,030 combinations are required to be evaluated at the k = 7 and 886,162
combinations can be reduced. At the level of 8, which is the last level of the evaluation,
only 424 out of 2,220,075 cases need to be tested and over 99.98% combinations are
removed, where ψ = 0.019%. For a larger system, the solution space will increase
exponentially but the ratio ψ indicates the reduction of total combinations as the k
increases. A smaller ratio ψ would indicate decreasing “worst case” combinations for
the next levels of k using power flow module as the verification.

3.2.1.2

Determination of Nonconvergent Power Flow

Under the steady-state approach, it is an indication of instability under one single system when a power flow model fails to converge [25, 127, 128, 129]. Depending on the
scenarios, sometimes it may require further investigation using dynamic simulation
to confirm a potentially unstable case.

It could also imply other situations, such as transfer capability of the transmission grid
is weakened by the protective relays with multiple electrical disconnections. Under
certain circumstance, multiple islands may also form as a result of the initiating
events. The errors are due to multiple subsystem split in which each of them requires
a slack bus to be initialized. We denote the failure of power flow convergence by
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SSf ailed .
SSf ailed (k) = PFf ailed (G′ (k)) ⋃ PFf ailed (G′′ (k))

(3.3)

where, PFf ailed (⋅) ∈ [0, 1] indicates either a converged or diverged outcome, respectively. SSf ailed (k) is the nonconvergent combination list at the level of k in the
extended enumeration. PFf ailed (G′ (k)) and PFf ailed (G′′ (k)) are the nonconvergent
solutions based on steady-state power flow evaluation based on the topology statuses
of hypothesized substation outages G′ and cascading failure G′′ , accordingly.

ssf ailed = SSf ailed (1) ∪ SSf ailed (2) ∪ ⋯SSf ailed (S ′ )

(3.4)

where ssf ailed is the final nonconvergent list that is derived from the k = 1 to k = S ′
where S ′ is at the level where it stops for future determination of combinations.

The sum of new reduced combinations at each level k before power flow verification
is estimated as follows:
snew,k = (CSk − χ)

(3.5)

where χ is the total reduction number that was extracted from the last level of
SSf ailed (k−1) set. The count of all level combinations before power flow is determined
as follows:
S′

Snew = ∑ snew,k
k=1
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(3.6)

Snew is the summation of total combinations from levels k = 1 to k = S ′ . This total
number before power flow is to determine nonconvergent combinations from the set
of Snew . This is used as a denominator for a ratio to estimate proportional reduction
from nonconvergent power flow cases.

The total sum S can be enormous when a larger power system is simulated. Determining the depth level of S ′ would avoid repeated enumeration of subsets. This
terminates the combinatorial evaluation at that depth level to assure completeness
of identifying the worst cases for computational effectiveness. The following is the
criterion to determine S ′ :

Depth{(PF(snew,k ) = ø) ⋃ (union(ssf ailed ) = Ssub )}

(3.7)

The conditions for these two to be met are based on combinatorial results from power
flow evaluation as well as assuring the unique set of total IP-based substations are
identified. Having this logical conditions would assure there are no other critical
combinations that might be neglected at the higher order of k. By doing so, this
would help to eliminate unnecessary enumerations as it approaches closer to S level,
which can be computationally intensive. Chapter 3.2.2 will detail with the proposed
enumeration algorithm to exclude the components in the power flow and overload
model.
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3.2.2

Incorporation of Switching Attack and Overloading
Consequences

Chapter 3.2.1 illustrates the mathematical model of extensive enumeration and the
computational complexity of hypothesized nodal outages shown in Fig. 3.1 (a) validated by power flow simulation. This section continues with the same scenario with
incurring overloads on transmission line(s)/power transformer(s), which is later to be
confirmed by power flow model on the potential system instability. Figs. 3.1 (b) and
(c) shows the sequential events how overloaded components are excluded from a power
flow model in 3 steps. The following subsections are the sequential examinations of
power flow convergence.

3.2.2.1

Consideration of Protection Schemes

The stability evaluation of cascading outages is a dynamic-security analysis with
variables in transient status such as time period, frequency and voltages instability,
generation-load rebalance, and cost/benefit analysis[130, 131]. Our focus in this research does not include transient analysis and is not discussed here. The steady-state
approach includes the overload model in our study to consider the effects of protection
scheme on transmission line. The currents are determined by the voltages and the

41

power flow solution of each line [132]. Since the overcurrent is preset based on the
rating of ampacity for a transmission line. The overcurrent scheme is also set as a
primary protection with high sensitivity. We have selected this scheme in our relaying
model, which will operate when the overcurrent magnitude exceeds the permissible
level to electrically disconnect a line.

Other protection schemes may be considered but might not be feasible in our study.
For example, the differential and pilot protection relays are measuring the variation
of currents between the two ending points of a transmission line, which may not
be triggered presumed fault within a particular line, i.e., our study simply does not
inject short-circuit fault currents in the model. Phase distance protection relays are
normally set as backup protection for transmission line with an extended time delay,
which is not applicable in the steady-state analysis. Additionally, the ground distance
protection is applied only when the phase and sequence data are available and the
zero sequence current will be detected in asymmetrical fault analysis, which is not
applicable in the steady-state evaluations. We assume that all overloaded lines would
be disconnected by the primary protection relays and the time delay is not included.

In our simulation, both G′ and G′′ are considered as initial value for steady-state evaluation. The determination of potential line outages is modeled based on the thermal
and ampacity limit of each branch [131, 133, 134]. For example, the hypothesized

42

nodal outages of substations A, B, and C, resulting in five transmission lines overloaded. If these branches met the tripping criteria of instantaneous overcurrent relay,
we exclude those incurring branches out of the power flow model. The power flow at
transmission line i is denoted by L = {l1 , l2 , ⋯, li , ⋯, lN } where N is the total number
of branches. The element vf,li in the set VF = {vf,l1 , vf,l2 , ⋯, vf,li , ⋯, vf,lN } denotes the
voltage of the from-node corresponding to the transmission line i. It is noticed that
both the set L and set VF acquire the same size of N . The current Ii that goes
through transmission line i can be calculated through the set L and set VF , which is
saved in the set I. Once it is detected that the ∣Il ∣ exceeds the corresponding pickup
value ∣Ip,l ∣ set by the instantaneous overcurrent relay, the transmission line l will be
disconnected. The tripping condition can be written as:

Condition A ∶(∣Il ∣ > ∣Ip,l ∣)

(3.8)

The flow of power at each transmission line l from power flow calculation is denoted
by LPF = {lPF,1 , lPF,2 , ⋯lPF,N } where N is the total number of branches and PF is the
thermal and capacity magnitude of lines from power flow calculation. The removal
of an overloaded branch is based on the following two conditions:

Condition B ∶(Lpf > Olimit,S (L))
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(3.9)

Condition C ∶(Lpf > Cl ) ⋀ (Olimit,L (L) < O(l, τ ))

(3.10)

where O(l, τ ) is ∫ [Lpf (τ ) − Cl ]dτ and Cl is the ampacity rating for each transmission
line. The relationship between short-term and long-term ratings are denoted by
Olimit,S and Olimit,L , respectively, Olimit,S = κ ⋅ Olimit,L and κ > 1.0. The τ defined
here is a small time window in between any causing or incurring event of pre and
post conditions. The relationship between this small time interval can have an abrupt
change in current magnitude either increase or decrease. Since the τ value is relatively
insignificant, we assume that the pre and post conditions can be modeled in a step
function for the two-period transition. The “tripped signals” be sent by the protective
relays will exclude those components as follows:

(Cond. A ⋁ Cond. B ⋁ Cond. C) → ltrip , l ∈ L

(3.11)

The additional short-term (condition B) and long-term (condition C) ratings of the
two operating limits are verified when there is a power flow solution. Under certain
conditions, we might encounter the situation of hypothesized substations outage that
does not contribute to the reduction of total generation and load, i.e., the hypothesized substations outage associated with no load or generators may incur overloading
conditions to other transmission lines that may not exceed the long-term limit but
short-term one. This OR logic of (3.11) indicates either one or more of the two
conditions.
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3.2.2.2

Detection of Islanding

In a larger system, the initiating event of switching cyberattacks upon those substations may incur overloading, resulting in multiple islands, which requires necessary
modifications on risk index[25]. For a smaller system, it may not necessarily split the
system into two or more islands; however, the power flow verification may disagree
with a diverged outcome. Combining equations 3.3 and 3.4, the result ssf ailed contain
the nonconvergent combinations with a potential overload.

The binary outcome for each power flow result does not indicate the root cause
of problem. Under the observation of this study, the initiating events of plausible
cyberattacks can result in splitting a power grid into multiple islands. Detecting the
number of islands is crucial for the proposed stability study in terms of modification of
risk index[25], which is a measure that quantifies the impact level of each hypothesized
combination of outages for the IP-based substations. The islands might not enable
power flow verification due to the lack of slack bus for each island and shall be handled
individually in order to power flow solutions.

Below are the steps to determine a case with more than two islands:

1. Initialize from the power flow calculation under the topology status of G′′ .
2. Identify all excluded lines from power flow models.
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Figure 3.3: Flowchart of extended enumeration incorporating the potential
overloads

3. Modify existing adjacent matrix A(G′′ ).

4. Determine the depth matrix Â(G′′ ) of A(G′′ ) where Â(G′′ ) = A(G′′ )Q and
46

Q = 1, 2, ⋯, ξ.
5. Find unique vector, row by row, from Â(G′′ ).

6. The total number of islands is determined from the total number of unique
vector.

As this may require future investigation, regardless of the number of islands formed,
we relate the risk of such case to be discounted for the risk metric R̃ = .5R [25].
The one-half constant indicates the uncertainty between the worst case and benign
situation associated with each substation outage.

Fig. 3.3 summarizes the proposed algorithm incorporated with an overload implication, which includes 2 main parts. Part (a) contains the combinatorial enumeration
of power flow evaluation with overloading implication. Part (b) contains the modification of risk index after an island is detected.

3.3

Improved Risk Metric with Islanding Consideration

The microprocessor-based protective relays will trip when a disturbance occurs and
will disconnect the line from a network. The disconnection of any single component by
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Figure 3.4: Possible intrusion paths within a substation network where the
microprocessor-based relays are instrumented to the physical facilities

the protection scheme is referred to a single component outage N -1 for the contingency
analysis. The setup of IP-based solutions is configured in each power substation. Fig.
3.4 depicts scenarios of an intrusion path on an IP-based substation and the critical
cyber assets within the substation control network. The hypothetical scenarios here
are the electronic intrusion by the attackers would help them to discover the IED
within the network that may further lead to execute manipulative switching operation.
We hypothesize the worst case outcome based on the intent of attackers’ motive, i.e.,
to disrupt operations by disconnecting large number of switches within the substation
from a power grid. We also assume that the hypothesized substation outage shall not
restrict to a single substation as the attackers may be able to compromise multiple
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Algorithm 1 The extended enumeration method
1: Load data
2: for k = 1 ∶ S do
3:
Initialize S-select-k combinations
4:
r ← run power flow of case[G(V /K)]
5:
if r = 0 then
6:
save it in the set S
7:
else
8:
remove the overloaded line(s) L
9:
r′ ← run power flow of case[G(V /K, E/L)]
10:
if r′ = 0 then
11:
save the case in S
12:
else
13:
continue
14:
end if
15:
end if
16:
set T ← unique (S(1) ⋃ S(2)⋯S(k))
17:
if T = V then
18:
return worst-case list S
19:
end if
20: end for
substations and execute their attack plan. We denote the total number of substations
in a power grid as S, where N > S. We represent G as the topological status of the
grid, where substation set V and branch set E.

A pseudocode of the hypothesized substation outages is given in Algorithm 1. This
extended algorithm of [25] emumerates with k = 1 to S. The steady-state analysis
is applied for the verification of critical scenarios of substation outages. The binary
results [0, 1] denote the convergent and nonconvergent solutions, respectively. Note
that K is a set of substations with size ∣K∣ = k, which is derived from the list of
complete combinations of S-select-k contingencies. The overloaded lines are the elements in the set denoted by L that are presumably tripped by relays. We describe
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the topological status as G(V /K, E/L) with the elimination of K substations and L
branches. The binary results of power flow evaluation are defined by r and r′ . A
worst-case list S is added with new cases during each iteration of selected outages
based on the results of power flow where row k is the array of the list S(k). All unique
substations T are recorded denoted by T ⊂ S. This extended enumeration algorithm
verifies cases with multiple islands with an incorporation of overloading effects. This
also improves the accuracy by eliminating the potential uncertainty of unevaluated
combinations. The algorithm creates a worst-case combination list, which helps to
determine the criticality of each substation under the proposed model.

This chapter provides a scenario where a power system is separated into two or more
subsystems while the substations under attack have been disruptively disconnected
from the grid through the local control console. As mentioned in the previous section,
we employ a steady-state power flow solution to verify critical scenarios (islanding
combinations). The outcome from the evaluation of a split system will not necessarily
agree with a converged solution because the slack bus may not able to balance the
generation-load difference within a power system.

A simplified DC power flow evaluation model is proposed in [131] to address cascading
scenario with elimination of the numerical inaccuracy with respect to a diverged
solution using AC power flow. In our study, we assume that the influence of the
power loss in a subsystem is reflected by the loss of active load, which is determined
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by accumulating the power loss of each isolated subsystems. A weighting factor wi
is introduced to quantify the impacts of the isolated subsystems based on the entire
power system by formulating the ratio of total power loss over the sum of the load
consumption which is defined as:
ΣPloss,j ΣPD − ΣPd,j ⋅ φj
=
ΣPD
ΣPD
ΣPd,j ⋅ φj
=1−
∈ [0, 1]
ΣPD

wi =

(3.12)

where i denotes an order of the cases that need to be evaluated in the list and j is the
sequential order of subsystems in each case. Ploss,j represents the active power loss in
the subsystem j. Pd,j indicates the outcome of load demand after the linearized power
flow evaluation in the subsystem j. The binary function φ(⋅) provides results that can
be either 0 or 1, representing the convergence status of the subsystem j. The total
amount of system load demand ΣPD is the denominator of the ratio, which is derived
from the initial steady-state model before the hypothesized substation outages. A
column vector given below corresponds to the maximum length of s:

w = [w1 , w2 , . . . , wi , . . . , ws ]T

The flowchart in Fig. 3.5 describes a mechanism to handle subsystem of a hypothetical
attack scenario. Notice that in the data initialization, the bus and branch set of
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Figure 3.5: Flowchart of islanding identification

the base case need to be modified by removing faulted components according to
the hypothesized substation outages. With implementation of power-flow evaluation
method, the criteria for determining the operation status of subsystem is defined
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by 2 perspectives: the generation-load difference and the ramping-up/down ability of
generation units within 1 minute. As depicted in the Fig. 3.5, the proposed weighting
vector assesses the impacts of the islanding issue on the entire power system, by
separately evaluating the load-generation balance and the portion of active power
loss in each isolated subsystem. The weights are directly related to the linearized
evaluation outcomes: φ and stable load demand of each subsystem Pd,j , which are
decided by the topology of the system and the initial results that we aforementioned
in previous chapter after applying the hypothesized contingency cases. Once the
topology and initial case are changed, the weighting vector would be renewed with
the corresponding updates of worst-case list.

It is assumed that the system is stable when the AGC is able to compensate
the difference between generation dispatch and load by changing their active
power outputs, otherwise, it requires further investigation with dynamic security
analysis, i.e., voltage and frequency stability evaluation. A detailed and elaborative
cascading model for a single case may greatly extend the computational time by
increasing the complexity of the algorithm because our study is a prospective
research with supportive evidence from the evaluations of massive enumerative
combinations. The risk index proposed in [25] presumes that each combination has
the same weights, which is 1.0. In our study, the risk index is modified by multiplying
the weighting factors based on the Eq. 3.12 and obtained weighting vector, as follows:
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⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪1 ⋅ wi,m ,
Rm = ⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
Nm ⋅wm
⎪
⎪
⎪
Nb−s ⋅wb−s =
⎪
⎩

if k = 1
(3.13)
Σwi,m
,
∑si=b+1 wi

if k > 1

where Rm is the risk index of substation m. Nm is the number of combination in
the list S that contains the specific substation m; wm is the weighting factor of
combination that includes substation m. Nb−s and wb−s denote the number of the
combinations with the size larger than 1 and the corresponding weighting factors,
where b and s are the number of the combinations with size of 1 and the length of the
list, respectively. wi,m is the weighting factor of combination containing substation
m with the order i in the w; k is the size of each combination.

3.4

Cyber-Induced Risk Modeling for Microprocessor Based Relays in Substations

3.4.1

Risk Modeling of Relay Outages

The combinations of the substation criticality have been investigated in the recent
years on “bottleneck list” in [25] and [30], which essentially assess the risk level for
each substation outage by identifying the cases that are critically-weakened conditions
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Figure 3.6: Schematic diagram of protective IEDs and the control perimeters within a substation

based on presumed attack scenarios. With the consistent representation of terminology in the definition of “critical” cases, the section extends the modeling of relay
outages that can be risky to manipulated that may initiate system-wide instability.

Fig. 3.6 depicts the details of the connectivity relationship between the protective
IEDs and their corresponding electrically controlling components in the substation i.
Suppose that the substation i has been compromised, the attackers would be able to
manipulate single or multiple protective relays. Different relay would generate different outage when it has been compromised. As depicted in Fig. 3.6, if the directional
distance relay has been compromised, attackers can manipulate a disruptive switching
command to electrically disconnect substation i + 1, thus other relays may misoperate
causing the transmission line (i, i + 1) to be de-energized. Similarly, the implications
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may occur on other relays within a substation or other regional substations so as
the resulting impacts to the power grid operation. In the steady-state analysis, the
hypothetical outages of compromised protective relay is treated as the modifications
on the relay is equivalent as the electrical modifications on the load demand, power
injection, and topology of the power system. For example, the outages of bus differential relay would disconnect all the electrical components from the system, including
transmission lines, transformer, lumped loads and generators.

To quantify this problem, the variable Ci,k is introduced to denote the set of the
electrical components, including all the lines, transformers, generator units, and loads,
which are electronically controlled by the protective IED k, at the substation i. To
enumerate all the possible successful cyber intrusions in the substation i, it generates
∑k∈K 2∣Ci,k ∣ different consequences, K is the total number of the IEDs in the substation
i. In our formulation, we’ll assume the attacker would maximize the impacts by
disconnecting as many electrical components as possible. Under this assumption,
′
Ci,k
is the most “severe” set that is understudied in the proposed formulation, where
′
Ci,k
⊂ Ci,k . Derived from the previous studies on the hypothetical substation outages

[25], it is observed that the assessment of the digital protective relays is a much more
complex problem, which includes a larger number of combinations:

S = ( ∑ 2∣C1,k ∣ ) ⋅ ( ∑ 2∣C2,k ∣ )⋯( ∑ 2∣CS,k ∣ )
k∈K1

k∈K2

= ∏( ∑ 2∣Ci,k ∣ )
i∈S k∈Ki
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k∈KS

(3.14)

Table 3.1
Results of standard deviation of IEEE test systems

Test systems
IEEE 30-bus
IEEE 39-bus
IEEE 57-bus
IEEE 118-bus
IEEE 300-bus

σ ≤ 1%
1
4
7
24
43

1% < σ ≤ 5%
49
61
74
238
411

5% < σ ≤ 10%
34
47
71
121
354

Total #.
106
131
245
439
959

where S is the total number of the substations in the system and Ki is the total
number of the IEDs in the substation i. The constant 2 indicates the open or closed
status for each scenario of associated IEDs and substations, which implies 2∣Ci,k ∣ sce′
narios if IED k is compromised. In our formulation, the most “severe” set Ci,k
is

considered for each IED k, which would create Ki different scenarios in total within
single substation i. Thus, the Eq. 3.14 can be modified as:

S = 2K1 ⋅ 2K2 ⋯2KS = ∏ 2Ki = 2∑ Ki

(3.15)

i∈S

where 2Ki represents the total number of outages of IEDs in substaion i. It is observed
that S is determined by the configurations of IEDs in each substation or the total
number IEDs in the system.

The right side of the Eq. 3.15 is the sum of the S-select-k formulation, which is expressed as the designated outages of two or more components/substations and would
produce different outcomes with or without considering outages of IEDs. For instance,
the S-select-3 problem on the substation outages would enumerate C330 = 4, 060 cases
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Figure 3.7: Algorithmic enumeration of relay outages

in IEEE 30-bus system. However, from the Table 3.4, it is observed that there are
106 IEDs are evaluated, which would generate 192, 920 scenarios consequently. It’s
predictable that the number of combinations would be greatly increased when studying larger cases. In this paper, we emphasize on detailing such hypothesized outages
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to the device level (the digital relays) to determine the relay outages. Different relay types may result in a consequentially different effect on the system when it’s
compromised.

3.4.2

Cyber-Induced Impact Assessment

3.4.2.1

Probabilities and combinations

A standard evaluation model for quantifying the risk of the disturbances or the outages is represented by the product of the event probability and its severity [135]:

Ri,k = Pri,k ⋅ Sri,k

(3.16)

where Ri,k is the risk index of the protective IED k at substation i, Pri,k denotes the
probability of event when the cyber intruder successfully hacks in the substation i and
manipulate the protective IED k, consequently, Sri,k is the severity of the outages,
′
which, in this paper, is represented using the most “severe” set Ci,k
. To simulate

probability of the intruding attempts, this paper assigns the probabilities based on
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′
the size of the set Ci,k
. The Eq. 3.16 is elaborated as follows:

Ri,k

⎧
⎪
′ ∣
⎪
∣Ci,k
⎪
∑i∈S ∑k∈K ∣Pi,k ∣
⎪
⎪
, If diverged
′ ∣ ⋅
⎪
∑k∈K ∣Pi,k ∣
⎪ ∑k∈K ∣Ci,k
=⎨
⎪
⎪
′ ∣
⎪
∣Ci,k
∣Pi,k ∣
⎪
⎪
,
Otherwise
⎪
′ ∣ ⋅
⎪
∑k∈K ∣Ci,k
∑k∈K ∣Pi,k ∣
⎩

(3.17)

′
′
where Pri,k = ∣Ci,k
∣/ ∑k∈K ∣Ci,k
∣ is the probability of the successful intruding attempts

towards the protective relay k in the substation i. In the study, it is assumed that
an attacker does not acquire the knowledge of the power system and does not have a
complete information of the entire power grid. They would enumerate all trials based
on the connectivity degrees of the relays that connect more electrical components.
′
These can be represented by Ci,k
. The probability is then calculated by measuring
′
the proportion of the size of the “severe” set ∣Ci,k
∣ to the sum of the “severe” sets for

all the protective relays.

In the Eq. 3.17, the variable Pi,k denotes the total injected power to the substation
node i, which are electronically controlled by the relay k. When the intruder successfully compromises the control panel and has the access to the IED k, all the power
that is connected to this IED is considered as potential risks. To quantify the outage
severity, the power flow evaluation is applied to verify the solutions of the study in
which the outcome can be either converged or diverged. For this reason, two different
indices are proposed.

In the first scenario, if a solution agrees with a converged result, the severity of the
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outage Sri,k is determined by calculating the quotient by dividing the injected power
that connected to the protective IED k using the total injected power to the substation
i, which is represented as ∣Pi,k ∣/ ∑k∈K ∣Pi,k ∣. The quotient locates the threshold [0,1].
If the solution is diverged, which suggests that the system can be unstable. Under
this scenario, the severity of such event is considered to be much more severe where
a potential system-wide blackout would occur. Sri,k = ∑i∈S ∑k∈K ∣Pi,k ∣/ ∑k∈K ∣Pi,k ∣ is
quantified as the severity of the outage. Note that the numerator is the total power
injection for the system. The proposed metric assures a comparable larger index than
the previous conditions.

3.4.2.2

Sensitivity analysis using standard deviation

To evaluate the performance of the proposed metric, the assigned probability Pri,k
captures successful intrusion of a given cyber network using pseudo-random numbers.
The results of the equal distribution of the probability are given in this problem,
in order to initiate a comparison study. The pseudo-random number is calculated
through:
Pi,k =

P′i,k
∑k∈K rand(1, K)

(3.18)

where rand(1, K) represents the function that generates an array of random numbers
within the interval (0,1), which has length of K. P′i,k is the k-th elements in the
array. The sum of these random number P′i,k will not necessarily give a 1.0, which
61

is not acceptable in probability distribution function. The scaling process is given
by dividing each random number with the sum of all the random numbers, thus, the
modified variable Pi,k is the k-th scaled random number which can be used as the
probability assigned to the outage of the relay k in the substation i.

Accordingly, the standard deviation σ is given as the index to assess the performance
of the proposed metric.

A 2
E
A 2
R
A 2
2
3σi,k
= (RC
i,k − Ri,k ) + (Ri,k − Ri,k ) + (Ri,k − Ri,k )

(3.19)

where RC
i,k denotes the risk of protective IED k in the substation i using the prob′
E
ability which are derived from the connectivity set Ci,k
. Similarly, RR
i,k and Ri,k

are the risk indices using probabilities of pseudo random value and equal distribution
method, correspondingly. RA
i,k is the average risk index. σi,k is the standard deviation
of protective IED k which is in substation i.

Fig. 3.7 describes the algorithm of the enumerative assessment for the protective
relays. The proposed algorithm includes two loops, which include the iteration of
power substations and the protective IEDs in each substation.
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Association of Digital Relays to Circuit Breakers

Hypothesized Substation Outages: S-select-k contingencies
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Figure 3.8: The architecture of protective IEDs and possible path enumeration within a substation network by hacking tools

3.5

Cascading Verification Initiated by the Switching Attacks through Compromised Relays

3.5.1

Vulnerabilities of Digital IED Architecture

The information communication technology has been widely deployed on the power
system. Digital relays are crucial to power system protection, control, monitoring,
and metering function. According to the IEC 61850 standards[136, 137, 138], IEDs
are deployed with a robust platform on a local area network (LAN) within a substation based on Ethernet communication. The convenient remote connections allows
protection engineers to visualize the connections and relationships between the control functions and the physical components through the human machine interface
(HMI). With the support of IEC 61850 standards, the protection engineer is able to
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customize the function settings of the relay to meet the specific requirement on the
digital relay input and output variables.
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Figure 3.9: The simulation results of switching attack on the distance
protection relays on the bus 2 in the IEEE 14-bus system

However, an IP-based protective relay may contain vulnerabilities that can be covertly
manipulated by attackers. The 2015 Ukraine attack, for example, exploited remote
access to IP-based substation equipment to disconnect busses and then erase the hard
drives of that equipment. While the attack was not reported to affect protective relays,
it does demonstrate the vulnerabilities of substation equipment to cyber attacks [11].
More recently, the US Department of Homeland Security issued an alert indicating
that Russian threat actors were targeting American electric facilities with remote
access attacks [139], and an alert indicating that safety equipment at industrial sites
had been targeted by a sophisticated remote control attack as well [140]. Available
hacking tools, e.g., Shodan, Nmap and Wireshark, can help attackers enumerate all
the IP-based devices in an interconnected communication network. These software
tools identify nearby devices if they are alive [141, 142, 143]. The vulnerabilities
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of remote connectivity to protective relays are summarized in the [144], which are
categorized as software security vulnerabilities, network security vulnerabilities, such
as denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, system vulnerabilities, and other miscellaneous
malware. For example, Fig. 3.8 introduces a possible intrusion scenario that the
starts from IED 4 to IED 5 that primarily protects transmission lines and feeders.
The S-select-k potential substation outage contingencies are covered in the Fig. 3.8
and have been investigated in previous work [25, 45]. The protective relay outages
would be extended as a more complicated combinatorial problem as more relays
with diverse functions are deployed on the substations. As shown in the Fig. 3.8,
the hypothetical outages initialized by a breaker-switching attack via compromised
protective relay b in the substation i is defined as an R-select-k contingency.

3.5.2

Disruptive Switching Attack via Local Digital Relays

Once the attacker successfully compromises the protective equipment, the attacker
would be able to maliciously manipulate the circuit breakers, remotely changing the
relay settings, which may cause (1) misoperation in the healthy condition or (2)
malfunction in a fault condition. The impact of cyberattack on the protective relay
is nontrivial and could lead to cascading failure of the system.

Suppose that the IEEE 14-bus system is in a steady-state condition, and the distance
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relays on the bus 2 has been compromised, which lead the transmission lines 1-2 and
2-5 to electronically disconnect from the system at 1.0s and 1.2s. Figure 3.9 details
the dynamic responses of load, bus voltage, frequency, and the rotor angle difference.
It is observed that the initial contingency leads to the decrease of the system frequency, which accordingly result in the loads shed at 1.26s. Over 90% of the loads
in the systems decrease rapidly in the following 0.5s. The generators are eventually
disconnected at the time of 1.55s because of the out-of-step phenomenon, which may
cause the entire system blackout. The results are provided by a time-domain simulation tool named CPAT [145]. Although some protection models such as fault clearing
protection models are missing, the major protections which are initiated by voltage
change and frequency change are implemented so that the system collapse caused by
large frequency and voltage deviations are properly represented in the dynamic model.
The malfunction caused by cyberattack would be more severe, compared to the traditional causes. For example, if the relay settings of the underfrequency protection
on the loads are maliciously tampered by the attacker, such as intentionally lowering the operating frequency band, such protection would not open the circuit breaker
correctly and fail to shed the loads. This would cause more significant frequency drop
and the second and the third level of underfrequncy protections are likely to operate,
which would eventually increase the size of the brownout, and, in the worst case, i.e.
if all generators are disconnected, might lead to a blackout.
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3.5.3

Screening the Diverged Cases of Power Flow

The extended enumerations of cyber-based substation outages are established [25,
45], which define the hypothesized substation outages as an S-select-k contingency.
As presented previously, the number of the complete combinations of substations is
∣S∣

∣S∣

∑k=1 Ck , where S is the substation set.

As shown in the Fig. 3.8, this proposed study extends the previous work to presume
switching attack via compromised relays associated with the breakers, i.e. R-select-k
contingency. Let R̃ denotes the set of protective relay in the system, where:

R̃ = R1 ∪ R2 ⋯ ∪ Ri ∪ ⋯ ∪ R∣S∣

(3.20)

Ri is the set of the relays of the substation i, such as:

i
Ri = [r1i , r2i , ⋯, rbi , ⋯, rB
i]

(3.21)

where rbi denotes the b-th protective relay on the substation i. B i denotes the cardinality of the relay set Ri of the substation i. Thus, the total number of the relay
combination enumerations SR is:
∣R̃∣

∣S∣

∣R̃∣

SR = ∑ Ck = 2∣R̃∣ − 1 = 2∑1
k=1
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Bi

− 1 ≫ SS = 2∣S∣ − 1

(3.22)

SS and SR denote the total number of enumerations of S-select-k and R-select-k
contingencies, respectively. It is obvious that the total number of combination enumerations is greatly increased when the protective relays outages are considered. For
example, assume that in a small 10-bus system, 3 protective relays are deployed on
each bus. SR is 220 times larger than SS . The evaluation size would be further increased if the coordination behaviours between the protective relays are considered,
since the sequential order of the relay operations would significantly increase the complexity of the problem. Note that the relay coordination and the backup protection
schemes are not the scope of this study.

3.5.4

3.5.4.1

Static and Dynamic Validation

Modeling of Protective Relaying Outages

The complexity of the enumerations on the protective relaying outages have been
introduced in previous sections. Generally, the protective coverage of the multiple
relays would be overlapped and it is common to deploy two or more protective relays
on the same equipment. The relay deployment and applications of rbi can be found in
the table 3.2, which details the basic relay fundamentals, applications and electrical
components, extracted from the [146]. As shown in the Table 3.2, each substation
may deploy numerous relays for single or multiple equipment, which would create an
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Table 3.2
The Fundamentals of relay deployments and applications on the substation
i

Protection
Objectives

Transmission
Lines
Feeders
and Loads

Protective systems and typical
relays rbi (if available)
Over/under-frequency relay
Inverse time overcurrent relay
Over/under-voltage relay
Transformer percentage differential relay
Inverse time overcurrent relay
Overload protection relay
Distance Protection:
Three-zone phase fault relay
Distance Protection:
Three-zone phase fault relay

Bus-bar

Differential protection

Generator
Power Transformer

Electrical
Components
Generation
unit
Transformer
Transmission
lines
Lumped
loads
Generators
Loads
Feeders
Lines
Transformers

extremely large set of relays. It is observed that on the one hand, multiple relays
are protecting the same equipment which may cause the same impact to the system;
on the other hand, the impact level can also be different varying from the relay
to relay. For example, compared with bus differential relay which connects multiple
electrical components such as generators, feeders, and transmission lines, the distance
protection relay obtains a lower level of impact to the system. This paper introduces
a ranking method on each substation to sort and collect the first N relays that
acquire higher impacts. It is assumed that these N relays would cover most of the
outage scenarios within the substation. By uniting N relays for each substation, to
differentiate from R̃, the relay set R̂ is introduced.
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(b) Protection schemes that deployed on the buses 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 14

(a) Topology of IEEE 14-bus system G0(V0,E0)
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Figure 3.10: The modified topology of the original graph G0 and the
fundamentals of protections deployment in the IEEE 14-bus system

This work applies graph terminologies to perform the algorithm of evaluations on
R̂-k contingencies. Let G(V, E) represents the graph topology of the power system,
where V and E denote the set of bus nodes and the set of edge. However, the original
topology may not be able to represent the deployments of the generators and loads,
therefore the set of generator and load nodes v0 and the corresponding incident set
of edges e0 are incorporated. Thus, the graph G0 (V0 , E0 ), where V0 = V ∪ v0 and
E0 = E ∪ e0 , is introduced to evaluate the protective relaying outages, as depicted in
the Fig. 3.10. Figure 3.10 also illustrates the correlation of the various protection
schemes and the corresponding electrical components of the buses 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, and
14. The dashed circles with different colors are representing the different electrical
components and its corresponding protection zones and relays. The initial event of
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compromised relay outages K(VK , EK ) can be presented in the following equation:

G0 (V0 , E0 )
´¹¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¸¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹¶

V ′ (G′ )=V0 (G0 )/VK

G′ (V ′ , E ′ )
´¹¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¸¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¶

ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ
→
′
′
E (G )=E0 (G0 )/EK

(a) initial system G0

Potential

ÐÐÐÐÐ→
overloading

(b) R̂-k contingency

E ′′ (G′′ )=E ′ (G′ )/EL

ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→ G′′ (V ′ , E ′′ ) ÐÐÐÐÐ→ PFf ailed
overloading outages
´¹¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¸¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¶ validation
power flow

(3.23)

(c) overloading case

Equation 4.4 represents the modeling process for protective relay outages, where
status (a) denotes the graph topology of the system before the initial event K, (b)
denotes the topology after event K with R̂-k relay contingency applied, (c) denotes
the topology with overloading implications. It is noticed that any initial event can
be represented by the event K with VK and EK , once the topology G0 is produced.
EL denotes the set of the overloading transmission lines, based on the same settings
of thresholds in [45]. PF(⋅) ∈ [0, 1] indicates either a converged or diverged outcome,
respectively. PFf ailed saves the diverged scenarios.

3.5.4.2

Static and Dynamic Verification

Deriving the concepts from the reverse pyramid model (RPM) in [25, 45], this chapter
applies an extended enumeration algorithm for identifying the critical relay, which is
given in the Fig. 3.11. It is worth noting that the an overload model is also incorporated in the steady-state method to diversify the RPM model. The criteria for
tripping the overloading lines are using the model in the [45]. In the static analysis,
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Figure 3.11: Extended enumerations on the identification of critical protective relays within static and dynamic methods

the italic fonts of case 1 and case 2 denote the system data after the initial event K and
the data with overloading implications, respectively. The dynamic time-domain simulation is included in the model to evaluate the consistency performance between the
converged combinations from the static simulation and the dynamic simulation. The
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loss of load for each scenario is collected to determine the size of the blackout of the
each event K and the blackout cases are saved in the DYf ailed . Based on the results
of “worst cases” in the PFf ailed and DYf ailed , the ratio of the verification between
the methods can be calculated. Other related electrical quantities, i.e. deviations of
frequency and voltage, are also recorded in the final results to further investigate the
behaviors of the test system. The risk-based index is also incorporated to evaluate
the impact level of each combination of digital relays, which quantifies the impact
level of each relay rbi [25, 45].

3.6

Simulation Study

The simulation study involves multiple IEEE test cases with 14, 30, 39, 57, 118, and
300-bus systems [147]. A wide range of test systems is used to ensure the consistency
of generalization from the study how the cascading outages would affect the outcome
of total combinations, based on the expended enumeration algorithm, as well as if
the size of a power system relatively may be vulnerability to a small number of
hypothesized substations outages.
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3.6.1

Test Case Setups and Computational Environment

This section begins with the illustration of IEEE case setup as well as the configuration of the computational platform are set up for the massive enumeration. It is
then followed by the simulation results in performance comparisons in terms of size,
combinatorial complexity in the earlier level of ks and speed up the improvement
with high-performance computing platform. In the section, we assumed modified
the risk index metric by R̃ = .5R [25], which indicates the uncertainty between the
worst case and benign situation associated with each substation outage. Most IEEE
test cases are arranged with a practical substation arrangement with the associated
buses for each voltage level, which is implemented with an extra vector to relate bus
information in the base case with substation association.

The test case is validated with an implemented algorithm that contrasts the proposed
methods in comparison with single and parallel computing modes. The simulations
with implications of linearized evaluation are built in the local laptop with specifications of Intel Core i7-5500u in 2.4GHz, with 2 cores, 4 threads, and 8 GB memory
installed. In the parallel computing mode, 8 independent worker nodes are aligned.
The setup of high-performance computing cluster is built with Rocks Cluster Distribution 6.1.1 in CentOS 6.3, containing 1 front end, 2 login nodes, 3×48 TB RAID60
network-attached storage (NAS) nodes with 33TB usable space, 92 CPU computing
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nodes in which each node has 16 CPU cores (Intel Sandy Bridge E5-2670 2.60 GHz)
and 64 GB RAM. The simulations in parallel mode are set up with 12 worker nodes.
The power flow parameters are set with Newton-Raphson as a default solver for up
to 10 iterations. Most IEEE test cases are arranged with a practical substation arrangement with the associated buses for each voltage level, which is implemented with
an extra vector to relate bus information in the base case with substation association, e.g., in the IEEE 118-bus system, bus node 25 and 26 are physically connected
through a transformation, with an extra generation unit implemented on the node
26. The node 25 and 26 are aligned together as an individual substation, which is
denoted as substation 24.

3.6.2

Substation Outages with Overloading Implications

3.6.2.1

Risk Index Comparison

Fig. 3.12 provides several pairs of comparison results of risk index under the condition
with and without overloading outages based on IEEE 14-bus, 30-bus, and 39-bus
systems. Under the observation of single substation outage on IEEE 39-bus system,
the single outage on individual substation 11, 14, 19, 22, and 23 results in power
flow diverged, resulting in the highest risk index value of 1.0. This scenario considers
with cascading effect denoted by case 1 in the figures. Under the condition without
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Figure 3.12: Risk index of IEEE systems with 14, 30, 39 nodes from left
to right with case 1 to include overloading effect and case 2 without.

cascading failure as case 2, the worst cases for individual substation outages are 11,
14, 19, 23. In IEEE 30-bus system, individual substation outage 6, 17, 20, and 22
are observed with the highest impact under case 1. Only two worst cases are present
in case 2. On the smallest size system among the three systems, realizing that either
individual substation 2 or 5 results in nonconvergent power flow solution in IEEE
14-bus system acquire under case 1; however, no worst case is present at the level
of k = 1 under case 2. It can be concluded that the highest impact of both cases is
related as follows:
PFf ailed (case 2) ⊆ PFf ailed (case 1)

(3.24)

where case 1 represents that the simulation is with overloading effect and case 2
without.
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3.6.2.2

Identification of S ′ with Overloading Implications

Table 3.3 lists the statistical details of the enumeration for each level under different
IEEE test cases. “# Total Comb.” column lists the total number of combinations
without elimination at k level. The “# Reduction χ” column shows the number of
combinations that has been reduced. “# New” records the number of cases that
need to be evaluated in the level k. Column PFf ailed = 1 indicates the total number
of nonconvergent combinations that occurs at each level. The disjoint of each level
nonconvergent scenarios can be generalized as follows:

SSf ailed (k) ⊍ SSf ailed (k + 1)⋯ ⊍ SSf ailed (S ′ ).

(3.25)

Table 3.3 details the simulation results of the extended enumeration algorithm with
the implementation of the overcurrent protection scheme. These are the sets for each
level that are exclusive of all to be used for identifying pivotal substations for the
investment of cyber infrastructure protection in planning. The simulation results for
the 3 IEEE test cases show that the inclusion of cascading effect can increase the
number of nonconvergent combinations at the earlier stage of k, which tremendously
reduces the combinations at higher k level. Not only this can be massive combinations,
a smaller number of combinations would also help to identify critical substations that
have nonconvergent solutions.
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Table 3.3
Summary of the results of IEEE test systems with implementation of
overcurrent protection scheme

Cases
#
14-bus

30-bus

39-bus

57-bus

118-bus

300-bus

3.6.2.3

k
1
2
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
2
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
5

# Total Comb.
sk
10
45
24
276
2,024
10,626
42,504
134,596
27
351
43
903
12,341
123,410
962,598
109
5,886
209,934
5,563,251
176
15,400
893,200
38,630,900
1,328,902,960

# Reduction
χ
24
156
1,593
9,354
40,315
132,172
231
603
10,197
112,594
922,402
3,675
164,673
4,893,480
13,384
856,221
38,137,765
1,328,307,418

# New
snew,k
10
21
24
120
493
1,272
2,189
2,424
27
120
43
300
2,144
10,816
40,196
109
2,211
45,261
669,771
176
2,016
36,979
493,135
595,542

PFf ailed
=1
3
1
8
5
15
17
39
59
11
30
18
7
10
21
39
42
44
347
3,717
112
82
274
2,099
111,552

Decreasing Ratio ψ

Decreasing ratio is presented in Eq. 3.2, which evaluates the decreasing rate under the
extended enumerative evaluation of each testing cases. In Table 3.3, it is noticed that
the depth S ′ for the IEEE 14-, 30-, 39-, 57-, 118-, and 300-bus system are 2, 6, 2, 5, 4,
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and 5, respectively. The decreasing ration ψ for the testing systems is calculated as
follows: ψ14−bus (1 − 2) are 100% and 55.56%; ψ30−bus (1 − 6) are 100%, 43.48%, 21.29%,
11.97%, 5.15%, and 1.80%; ψ39−bus (1 − 2) are 100% and 34.29%; ψ57−bus (1 − 5) are
100%, 33.22%, 17.37%, 8.76%, and 4.18%; ψ118−bus (1 − 4) are 100%, 37.56%, 21.56%,
and 12.04%; ψ300−bus (1 − 5) are 100%, 13.09%, 4.14%, 1.28%, and 0.04%.

The high decreasing rate in larger cases implies that the larger cases include more
critical substations, which supply more active power with larger generation and might
serve as a ‘cut node’ that separates the system into several isolated subgrids and agrees
with ‘1’ in PFf ailed evaluation if they are removed from power system.

3.6.2.4

Nonconvergence and Islanding

This is a two-stage verification with a hypothesized outage of one or more substations
as well as its resulting cascade based on the switching attacks. This study is to
determine if islanding may occur upon hypothesized outages. Under the observation
on the base case of IEEE 57-bus system in Table 3.3, less than 5% combinations
require power flow verification. The resultant 95 cases out of 53 499 cases cannot
converge with a load flow solution. In contrary on IEEE 118-bus system, 12.413%
cases are required power flow verification and 4 150 out of 717 352 cases cannot
converge. In IEEE 300-bus cases, over 99.8% cases are filtered out based on the
proposed algorithm. There are 1 127 848 cases remaining, which include 114 119
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nonconvergent cases. The ratio between PFf ailed = 1 and “# New snew,k ” reflects
the effectiveness of identifying worst-case scenarios, which is 12.90%, 2.19%, 27.89%,
0.18%, 0.58%, and 10.11% for all IEEE test systems. The detailed combination
solutions and the corresponding ratio ψ are illustrated in Fig. 3.16. The left y-axis
value is given as the computation time(s). Figs. 3.13, 3.14, and 3.15 depict the risk
index of hypothesized substations at level k = 1 for the cases of IEEE 57-bus, 118-bus,
and 300-bus systems, respectively. Compared with the most cases mentioned above,
these larger cases are all evaluated with consideration of cascading consequence.

Figs. 3.14 and 3.15 also reflect potential islanding risks. As shown in Fig. 3.14,
54.76% substations out of the combinations at the first level (k=1) has the “worse
case” scenarios. The absence of 45.24% substations can implicate islanding instability,
i.e., tripping outages that result in excluding transmission lines 8-9, 12-117, 68-116,
71-73, 85-86, and 110-111 out of the system could disconnect bus 9, 10, 117, 116, 73,
86, 87 and 111 from the main grid. At the first level of IEEE 300-bus case, as shown
in Fig. 3.15, 60.71% substations are concluded with the highest impacts, bars colored
in blue with 39.29% cases can be at risk of potential islanding implication.

3.6.2.5

Computing Performance Analysis

Fig. 3.16 illustrates the results of computing performance of the proposed algorithm
with implementation of parallel computing modes. Most cases with less than 30
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Figure 3.13: Risk index of IEEE 57-bus system

Figure 3.14: Risk index of IEEE 118-bus system

nodes do not make an obvious difference in computation time. It is observed that the
computation time is related to the number of the “new” cases during each level k.
Additionally, the subtle difference in parallel and series is observed in IEEE 14-bus
system. There are two major aspects that may influence this that are based on: (1) the
more local workers are assigned, and (2) size of the test cases. The initialization may
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Figure 3.15: Risk index of IEEE 300-bus system
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Figure 3.16: Extrapolation of computation time for larger power systems
using parallel computing platform

dominate the time elapsed for smaller test cases in parallel mode. The typical time
required for initialization can range from 40 to 50 seconds. The variation of estimated
time can be random as it all depends upon the state of computing clusters and its
availability. In the smaller test cases, there may require hundreds, if not thousands, of
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iterations. This implies that the high-performance platform may not be fully utilized.
However, in the case of a larger system such as IEEE test systems with 118 or 300
nodes, the computation time in parallelizing the independent combinatorial cases
demonstrates a speedup, which requires much lesser than in serial mode. The larger
cases demonstrate the effectiveness of utilizing the parallel computing platform.

It is presumed that the computation time elapsed is directly proportional to the
number of committed processors in high-performance platform. The allocation of
processors is 3 for IEEE 14- and 30- bus systems and 4 processors assigned for the
remaining four IEEE test cases, i.e., the systems with 39, 57, 118, and 300 nodes.

By default, the high-performance environment is set to be in multi-processor mode.
In consideration of computing resource utilization, the exact number of processors
to be assigned is defined by the users. Memory is one critical peripheral of computer system that can affect computing efficiency. In the setting on spatial utilization, the maximum memory used for the IEEE14-bus system is utilized with
3.907GB in series mode and it is 47.155GB for parallelizing. The maximum memory utilization for IEEE 30-bus system is 4.036GB, and 47.402GB, respectively. The
IEEE 39-bus system has a slight difference in both modes, i.e., 3.9391 GB in serial mode and 47.376 GB in parallel mode.

Finally, for IEEE 118-bus system,

there is not a significant bumpup of computing resources with 4.128GB in serial
and 49.012GB in parallel. An empirical equation is tentatively approximated to
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be Max. MemoryParallel ≈ Max. MemorySeries × # workers. The proposed estimation
equation would be applied to qualitatively extrapolate the possible memory used for
larger systems.

A detailed time-consuming performance of the algorithm is provided in Fig. 3.16,
which shows an exponentially increasing characteristic with respect to system size
using proposed enumerative method. The proposed algorithm extends the testing
cases and determines the depth S ′ by enumerating all the possible solutions and
combinations, which may differ the operating time for the various testing systems.
The proposed algorithm focuses on the planning study which formulates a quantitative
metric to evaluate the risk level for the substations, which may not be necessary to
be implemented in real-time assess modules. Additionally, for a larger system, the
required computation time could take up weeks that is time-consuming and may not
be applicable in online environment.

In Fig. 3.16, it shows a fitting curve of enumerative performance in parallel computing mode with the increase of the combination solution pool for each IEEE
testing systems. The proposed algorithm demonstrates the required computation
time based on memory utilization and each CPU in the computing nodes at the
time.

The fitting function of elapsed time f (x), where x denotes the number

of evaluated combinations. The parallel computing time can be estimated using
f (x) = (5.47 × 10−5 )x3 + (−1.54 × 10−2 )x2 + (66.314)x − 150.64 with 95% confidence
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bounds and 88.561 of norm of residual. It can be observed that the performance is
correlated with system size and the combination pool for each case; however, we noted
that the decreasing ratio ψ changes from 56.36% in IEEE 14-bus system to 0.08% in
300-bus system. This ratio ψ can help researcher/operator to quantitatively estimate
the testing combination space for a larger system and the extrapolation function will
provide a computation estimation in time. The elapsed time of the 300-bus system
in serial time is 37.15 hours in which the deviation is 0.55%. The proposed fitting
function with parameters can be applied to estimate the required time. This can
help planning engineers to expect the time variation based on the size and computing
modes, although different topologies with the same size may make a difference. This
shows a time reduction of enumeration that is close to 90%. With the estimation
function, for 1000 substation system can be extrapolated approximately 30 days.

In summary, this enumerative study introduces a systematic method to quantify
cyber-induced contingencies with hypothesized substation outages and incurred overloads. The proposed algorithm is validated through a steady-state evaluation using 6
IEEE test systems (with 14, 30, 39, 57, 118, and 300 nodes). The evaluation is proceeded to ensure the coverage of all critical “worst-case” substations combinations are
identified at each level k and the subsets of nonconvergent substations combinations
are excluded for k + 1 level to avoid explosion of combinations. The validation of its
application has been greatly extended by incorporating steady-state load flow evaluation and the consideration of islanding formations after presumption of hypothesized
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substation attacks. This research also studies with a simplified model of potential
cascading by introducing cascaded overloads after the initial cyberattack events. A
further possibility of incorporation of cyber-based evaluation of hypothesized outages
with dynamic-security analysis shall be investigated for the future work. A comparable analysis towards the simulation performance in between serial and parallel
computing modes has been established based on a platform of the superior computing
cluster.

3.6.3

Risk Index Modification with Islanding Implications

This chapter investigates the islanding implications based on the results of previous
section using IEEE 30-, 39-, 57-, 118-, and 300-bus system. In details, the IEEE 30bus system is installed 6 generators with 335 MW of total active generation capacity
and 189.2 MW of active load. IEEE 39-bus system case contains 7367 MW of total
active generation capacity and 6254.2 MW of active load with 10 generators. IEEE
57-bus system is installed with 7 generators with 1975.9 MW of total active capacity
and 1250.8 MW of load demand. We presume that the generation adjustment is proceeding within one minute after the initial contingency is applied with the ramping
rate as 8% MW/min. The study has simulated 4,130, 1,238, and 6,690 combinations
for IEEE 30-, 39-, and 57-bus systems, respectively, based on the proposed enumerative algorithm. The critical lists for IEEE systems are given in table 3.4, table 3.5,
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and Fig. 3.17.

Figure 3.17: Modified risk index of IEEE-57 bus system with islanding
implications

Fig. 3.18 displays the number of islands after the evaluation of proposed method
based on IEEE 30- and 39-bus cases. The length of the worst-combination list in
the testing of IEEE 30-bus system is 23, including 4 combinations with the size of 1,
19 combinations with size of 2. There are 21.74% combinations proved to lead the
power grid to split into 2 or more isolated subsystems. In the test of IEEE 39-bus
system, the number of combinations in the list is 86, including 5 combinations with
the size of 1, 34 combinations with the size of 2, and 47 combinations with the size
of 3. Over 54.65% combinations are identified with indications of isolated sub-grids.
In the simulation of IEEE 57-bus system, which is drawn in Fig. 3.19, the system
contains the 191 combinations in the list. The number of combinations with the size

87

of 1, 2, and 3 is 5, 95, and 101, respectively. Combinations with 13 worst cases are
verified with the islanding scenarios. The modified risk index is drawn in Fig. 3.17,
the bar graph colored in red highlights the value of high risk index. Substations 1, 8,
22, 28, and 31 in the IEEE 57-bus system are verified to acquire a high risk index.

Figure 3.18: The number of islands in IEEE 30- and 39-bus systems in
accordance with the order of worst-combination list

Figure 3.19: The weighting vector and the number of islands in IEEE
57-bus system
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Tables 3.4 and 3.5 are the results of comparison between the risk index for cases with
and without islanding using IEEE 30- and 39- bus system, respectively. The fourth
column in each table records the difference between the value of risk index with or
without islanding implications. The colored rows annotate the substations whose
risk indexes are modified. The rows in blue, yellow, and green denote the difference
that falls within 40%, 40-50%, and over 50%, respectively. It can be observed that
the corresponding substations (4, 13, 14, 19, 22) have been corrected, and 4 out
5 substations changed within 40% and the risk index of substation 22 declines by
84.71%. When applying the initial outage of substation 22, the system is islanded
into 2 subsystems. Subsystem 1 contains the active load of 162.3 MW and 13 MW for
subsystem 2; however, no generation unit is assigned for subsystem 2, which directly
leads the subsystem 2 into blackouts. After adjusting the generation-load imbalance
of 13.9 MW, the subsystem 1 reaches a stable status of load shedding with the amount
of 13.9 MW and a total loss of 15.4 MW.

Table 3.5 details two critical lists of IEEE 39-bus system with the comparison between
the cases with and without islanding implications. In the table, it is concluded that
the risk indexes of 59.26% substations have been modified with proposed method for
assessing the risk of isolated subsystems. 12 substations have been modified with
around 40% of dropping and risk indexes for these 4 substations (4, 12, 21, and
23) have been decreased with over 55% rate. When testing an initial contingency
of hypothesized outage of the substation 23, the system is split into 2 subsystems.
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Table 3.4
Comparison of risk index with and without islanding on IEEE 30-bus
system

Substation
Order #
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Risk index in case
with islanding
0.1053
0.2632
0.0526
0.3901
0.0526
1.0000
0.0526
0
0.0526
0.2105
0
0.0526
0.0653
0.0653
0.2105
0.0526
1.0000
0.1579
0.1269
1.0000
0
0.1529
0
0

Risk index in case
without islanding
0.1053
0.2632
0.0526
0.4737
0.0526
1.0000
0.0526
0
0.0526
0.2105
0
0.0526
0.1053
0.1053
0.2105
0.0526
1.0000
0.1579
0.2105
1.0000
0
1.0000
0
0

Differece
in percent.
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
17.65%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
N/A
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
39.70%
39.70%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
39.71%
0.00%
N/A
84.71%
N/A
N/A

Subsystems 1 and 2 involve 5625.7 MW and 489.5 MW of active load respectively,
and both subsystems 1 and 2 have been reached a new separate stable point.

For another example, when applying the initial hypothesized outage of substation 14,
which is align with bus node 16, the system is divided into 3 parts by removing the
fault branches 15-16, 16-17, 16-19, 16-21, and 16-24. Subsystem 1 is containing 28
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Figure 3.20: The weighting factor of IEEE 30- and 39-bus system in accordance with the order of worst-combination list

bus nodes which involves 6 generators with injection of 3947.9 MW of active power;
Subsystem 2 is constituted by the nodal set [21, 22, 23, 24, 35, 36] and 2 generators
are assembled on the node 35 and 36 with 1210 MW generation capacity; Subsystem
3 is composed of the bus set [19, 20, 33, 34] and installed 2 generators equipped with
1140 MW of power supply. Under the verification of the proposed assessing method,
only subsystem 2 is validated to be able to reach a new stable point by ramping down
379.9 MW of generation power.

It is noted that the index value of substation criticality has dropped from the highest
level (non-convergent solution for the power flow evaluation, Rm = 1) to the acceptable level (Rm = 0). When applying a hypothesized outage on substation 23 on IEEE
39-bus system, the substation is presumably disconnected, resulting in branches 2526, 26-27, 26-28, and 26-29 are electrically disconnected. The system is split into 2
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Table 3.5
Comparison of risk index with and without islanding on IEEE 39-bus
system

Substation
Order #
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Risk index in case
with islanding
0.0708
0.1400
0.1385
0.0858
0.0741
0.1605
0.0617
0.0852
0.0772
0.1111
1.0000
0.1100
0.1071
0.8079
0.0749
0.0467
0.0741
0.01479
1.0000
0.0617
0.0024
1.0000
0
0.0491
0.0247
0.0741
0.0969

Risk index in case
without islanding
0.1111
0.2222
0.2346
0.1975
0.0741
0.1605
0.0617
0.1235
0.1358
0.1111
1.0000
0.2469
0.1852
1.0000
0.1235
0.0741
0.0741
0.0247
1.0000
0.0617
0.0123
1.0000
1.0000
0.0111
0.0247
0.0741
0.1358

Differece
in percent.
36.27%
36.99%
40.96%
56.56%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
31.01%
43.15%
0.00%
0.00%
55.45%
42.17%
19.21%
39.35%
36.98%
0.00%
40.49%
0%
0.00%
80.49%
0
100.00%
55.81%
0.00%
0.00%
28.65%

subsystems: subsystem 1 consists of 9 generating units up to a total of 5467.9 MW,
where subsystem 2 has a total generation of 830 MW. With these generating units
in those two islands, they are able to reach a stable condition by ramping up the
output of 157.9 MW in subsystem 1 but requires to shed the load with the amount
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Figure 3.21: The time-consuming performance of algorithm for IEEE-118
bus system
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Figure 3.22: The time-consuming performance of algorithm for IEEE-300
bus system

of 340 MW in subsystem 2. Thus, the weighting factor for hypothesized outages on
substation 23 should be assigned a zero value.
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Figure 3.23: Modified risk index of IEEE-118 bus system with islanding
implications

Figure 3.24: Weighting factor of IEEE-118 bus system
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Fig. 3.20 depicts two weighting vectors for IEEE 30- and 39- bus cases. In the IEEE
30-bus system, it is the subtle amount we notice that only a few substations (5 out of
24) require adjustment of risk values based on the islanding conditions. The sum of
the weighting factor in the system is 20.56 with the small fraction of 10.6% decrease
compared with the case without islanding implications; in the IEEE 39-bus system,
over half of risk indexes of substations (16 out of 27) are modified with proposed
evaluation method. The Σwi is 46.24 with over 46.22% amount of weighting factors
are decreased compared with the case without implication of islanding issue. For example, in the Table 3.5, the risk index of substation 12 is 0.2469 in the case without
islanding implications and there are totally 20 combinations with equal weighting factor 1 because any one of combinations will cause the whole system into a system-size
blackout. When applying the proposed metric, 10 out of these 20 combinations could
cause the power grid split into several subsystems, which may cause the weighting
factor less than 1 once the subsystem is verified to be able to reach a new stable point
when the rebalance is completed through generation adjustment or load shedding.

Fig. 3.24 represents the simulation results of the weighting factors in the IEEE-118
bus case. The total active generation capacity installed in IEEE-118 bus system is
9966.2 MW and the load in the system is 4242 MW. 54 generation units are assigned in the test case with 17 active generation injection nodes and 34 reactive
compensation nodes. According to the Table 3.3, the total number of the worst-case
scenarios in the extended enumeration method in each level is 973 with 44 cases, 93
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cases, and 836 cases in the level k = 1, 2, and 3 respectively. In the level k = 1, 44
single-substation outages are detected in the extended enumeration evaluation with
overloading implications, whose risk index is 1.0, however, the weighting factors for
over 45.4% single-substation cases are less than 0.1. For example, when removing
substation 76, which associates with bus node 85, the system is split into 2 subsystems. Small subsystem contains bus node (86,87) and larger subsystem contains other
bus nodes except bus node 85. 4 MW active power loss is detected in the separation.
Additionally, when the substation 91, which associates with bus node 100, is removed
from the system because of the hypothesized outages, the line 92-100, 94-100, 98-100,
99-100, 100-101, 100-103, 100-104, and 100-106 are electrically disconnected from the
system. An island containing substation (103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110,
111, 112) has been formed with 76 MW of active power generation installed. The
weighting factor of substation 91 outages reduces from the 1.0, which represents the
necessary blackouts of the system if substation 91 compromised, to the 0.0744 within
safety lower level because the islands-stability evaluations validate that the one of the
subsystems will be able to reach to a new stable status through regulating the active
generation outputs. The modified risk index is given in Fig. 3.23. The computing
time for enumerating all the 973 cases is 48.95 seconds in the serial model with 1
computing core, 1 worker, and 1209 MB memory usage.

The details of time performance of the algorithm for IEEE 118-bus system is given
in Fig. 3.21, which is provided by MATLAB (R2015b, version: 8.6.0.267246), in a
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descending order with total computational time. “riskmodify118” is the main function
that is called once and enumerates all the worst-case substation list derived from the
previous results. “mpoption” is a control function that determines the status of the
systems, which is provided by MATPOWER, incorporating with “submodify118” and
“Subtest118” , which remove the hypothesized substations and update the topological
status of testing cases by modifying the bus, generation, and branch sets.

Figure 3.25: The number of islands in worst-case list of IEEE-300 bus
system

IEEE 300-bus system includes 176 electrical substations with 23935.4 MW of power
generation and 7983 MVAr of reactive power. 69 generators are installed in the
system. Fig. 3.25 lists the number of islands in the worst-case substation list of IEEE
300-bus system for the level k = 1, which contains 106 cases. According to the Table
3.3, there are 348,367 worst-case combinations need to be tested through the proposed
method. For example, when applying the substation outages on the substation of 11,
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Figure 3.26: Weighting factor of IEEE 300-bus system

Figure 3.27: Modified risk index of IEEE 300-bus system with islanding
implications

which associates the bus nodes(20, 21), branches 13-20, 20-27, 20-23, 21-12, 21-19,
and 21-24 are electrically disconnected from the power system, which directly forms
a small islands containing bus nodes(22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 320,7023, 319, 7024) with
generation capacity of 595 MW installed.
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Fig. 3.26 details the weighting factor of IEEE 300-bus system with the ramping rate
of 250 MW/minute. As described in the Table 3.3, 348,367 cases are enumerated in
this simulation. All the value recorded in the figure are limited in the [0,1] based on
the definition of 3.12. 197,397 worst-case combinations are modified and 43.34% cases
appear high-risk value (1.0) after the evaluation. The modified risk index are given in
the Fig. 3.27, 23.30% substations display the high-index risks of potential system-size
blackouts if they were complete compromised. For example, substation 1 associates 6
bus nodes (1, 7001, 2, 7002, 3, 7003) and 5 power transformers and 3 generation units
with the capacity of 2300 MW, which is tested to be able to cause the instability to the
system through power flow evaluation with implications of islanding and overloading.
We can conclude that the substation 1 serves as a pivotal substation that may need
a larger investment and implementation of the high-priority protection scheme. Fig.
3.22 details the programming performance with descending order of time-costing.
The parallel computing toolbox is implemented in the main script which uses all 2
computing cores and 4 threads within 8 worker nodes. The total computing time is
7,316 seconds which saves 78.66% time compared with serial computing mode, which
costs 14 hours.
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3.6.4

Probability-based Results of Hypothesized Relay Outages

This study is validated using IEEE test systems. IEEE 30-bus system contains 6
generation units and 20 loads, which generate 191.6 MW power to the system and
consume 189.2 MW power respectively. IEEE 39-bus system contains 9 generation
nodes and 21 loads are connected to the system. 12 power transformers are connected
to the system. It is observed that 6297.9 MW power is injected into the system and
6254.2 MW power is dispatched to the loads. IEEE 57-bus system is installed with
17 transformers and 7 generation units, which supply 1278.7 MW to the grid. The
fixed 42 loads consume 1250.8 MW power in total. IEEE 118-bus system contains 54
generation units, 99 fixed loads, and 9 power transformers. The total power injection
to the grid is 4374.9 MW and the total load consumption is 4242 MW power. 69
generators are installed in the IEEE 300-bus system with 23935.4 MW power supply
and 201 loads totally consume 23525.8 MW of power. For each IEEE test case, it is
initialized with five default protective relays in each substation, which are directional
overcurrent relay, bus differential relay, directional distance relay, under frequency
relay, and transformer relay. For different bus type and configuration, the set of
protective relays will diversify. It is noticed that the in the Eq. 3.17, the diverged
solution would give a comparably higher value than the converged solution, in this
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section, in order to explicitly identify the “worst” cases, all the risk indices of diverged
solutions are modified to 1.0.

Figure 3.28: Risk index of protective relays in IEEE 30-bus system

Figure 3.29: Risk index of protective relays in IEEE 39-bus system

Figs. 3.28–3.32 display the results of propsed risk index for different relays in IEEE
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30-, 39-, 57-, 118-, and 300-bus systems, respectively. From these figures, the negative markers represent “not available” for such relay. For example, it is assumed in
this study that the under frequency relays are equipped with the substations with
generators. For those substations which are not classified as generation bus or load
bus, the transformer relays are not equipped. In this respect, the negative risk value
is given to differentiate the relay configurations between each substations. In the
Fig. 3.28, the bus 11 is not modeled with any relay as the solutions of steady-state
analysis reveal that the power flows from/to the bus 11 is 0 MW, which, based on the
definition in the Eq. 3.17, would assign 0 as the risk index for each relay. However,
the potential risks of relay outages in this substation may still exist. The cascading studies and transient analysis can be included to improve the existing model for
future enhancement.

From the figures, it is observed that risk index for most relays are within [0.35, 0.50].
The critical IEDs are marked out with risk index of 1.0. For example, in IEEE 30-bus
system, the overcurrent relay in the substation 9, bus differential and distance relays
in the substation 12, 25, and 27, are identified as “worst” relays which would cause
the system-wide instability in the steady-state analysis. In IEEE 39-bus system, it
is observed that 18 out of 195 relays are identified as the critical relays, 11 out of
which are bus differential relay. In IEEE 57-bus system, it can be observed that 9
out of 285 relays are evaluated as critical relays with 1.0 risk index, 5 of them are
bus differential relays and 4 of them are distance relays. In IEEE 118-bus system,
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16 out 590 relays are found to be critical and half of them are bus differential relays.
Similarly, in the IEEE 300-bus system, 125 relays are identified as critical. 28% of
the relays are directional distance relays, 59% of them are bus differential relays.

Figure 3.30: Risk index of protective relays in IEEE 57-bus system

Figure 3.31: Risk index of protective relays in IEEE 118-bus system
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Figure 3.32: Risk index of protective relays in IEEE 300-bus system

Generally, the distance relays in large-sized system are ranked as critical outage
whereas the impacts of a relatively smaller system may not have similar impacts.
For example, substation 186 is connected with a load demand of -21 MW, which
would provide 21 MW to the grid. Once the distance relay has been compromised,
the outgoing lines of the substation would be disconnected, in which case, all the
branches (93-186, 185-186) adjacent to that bus would be consequently disconnected.
Thus, the substation 186 is islanded and the unbalance between the generation and
load demand cannot be absorbed in the steady-state power flow analysis. From the
observation of this simulation study, the larger cases with a larger lumped load per
location (substation) can also result in a higher risk level of distance relays.

By integrating the results found risk index evaluations, it is concluded that the bus
differential relay acquires the highest risk index compared with other relays because
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1) bus differential relay is the most commonly deployed relay in the substation and 2)
it would electrically disconnect all the switches from the system if it has been compromised, which would change the system configuration and remove the substation from
the initial setup in the test system. To improve the risk metric of the bus differential
relays, the potential cascading failure is needed to be further studied. Additionally,
the impacts of directional distance relay are higher than the directional overcurrent
relay due to the physical relations and relays where the disconnects affect abrupt
change of the operating states. Compared with distance relay, overcurrent relay is
assumed installed on the incoming lines from generators and local loads. When it
has been compromised, the power injections and load demand would largely be disconnected from the system. However, the compromised distance relay would change
the topology of the initial grid and consequently, cause substation islanded from the
system, which is unstable in the study of steady-state evaluation.

Figure 3.33: Standard deviation σ for IEEE 30-bus test system

106

Figure 3.34: Standard deviation σ for IEEE 39-bus test system

3.6.4.1

Sensitivity analysis of proposed metric

In order to compare the performance using different probability distribution, the Eq.
3.19 introduces the standard deviation to evaluate the sensitivity of the proposed
metric. Table 3.4 in section II summarizes the detailed results of standard deviations
for each IEEE test cases. The σ is denoted by the standard deviation and the middle
three columns record the number of relays whose σ are in the thresholds of (0, 0.01],
(0.01, 0.05], and (0.05, 0.1], respectively. The ’Total #’ denotes the number of protective IEDs that are evaluated through the proposed method for each test system.
Each substation might have different protective IED configuration. When starting
the standard deviation evaluation, the relays that are recorded in negative risk index
in the previous sections should be eliminated. For example, in the IEEE 30-bus system, under frequency relay is not available in the substation 3 but is equipped in the
substation 2.
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Figs. 3.33–3.37 show the standard deviations for different relays using different probability distributions in the IEEE test systems. Generally, it is recorded that 79%, 85%,
62%, 87%, and 84% of relays acquire the standard deviation within 0.1 for IEEE 30-,
39-, 57-, 118-, 300-bus system, respectively.

Figure 3.35: Standard deviation σ for IEEE 57-bus test system

Figure 3.36: Standard deviation σ for IEEE 118-bus test system

As summarized in Table 3.4, it is observed that the σ of 80% of relays are located in
the interval (0, 0.1], which equals to the variance in the interval (0, 0.01]. Additionally,
it is realized that the σ for most scenarios are located in the section 3% ≤ σ ≤ 8%,
which is the middle part of the in the interval (0, 0.1]. To specify the distribution, Fig.

108

Figure 3.37: Standard deviation σ for IEEE 300-bus test system

Figure 3.38: Statistical summary of the protective relays distribution according to standard deviation interval

3.38 details the numerical results the relay distributions according to the standard
deviation interval, notice that each big interval would represent 0.025 incremental
of the standard deviation as the x-axis variable. The portion of the relays in the
corresponding standard deviation interval is given as the y-axis variable. For example,
combining these five test systems, approximate 25 % of relays would locate in the first
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interval σ ≤ 2.5% and 30% of relays are found in the interval 2.5% ≤ σ ≤ 5%. According
to the distribution sample points in the fig. 3.38, it is statistically observed that such
distribution can be fitted using a Normal distribution or Poisson distribution with
the mean approximately equals to 8 units, which suggests that σ equals to 0.04.
The fitting function would be determined to calculate the confidence interval for the
standard deviation. Additionally, it is revealed that the σ of critical relays are much
less than other relays. Because the Eq. 3.17 suggests that the higher the severity
of the event, the lesser the risk index would be that is affected by the probability
distribution. In this respect, the critical protective relays recorded in the risk index
figures can be considered as reliable in the sense of steady-state analysis.

3.6.5

Static and Dynamic Verification of Through Compromised Protective Relays

3.6.5.1

Computational Environment and Test Case Setup

This simulation study evaluates IEEE 14-, 30-, 57-, and 118-bus systems using steadystate analysis. MATLAB R2018a (9.4.0.813654) is used as the simulation tool for
steady-state analysis with supported by the high-performance computing cluster, Superior, which contains 92 compute nodes and each node is deployed with 16 CPU
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cores in Intel Xeon E5-2670 at 2.60GHz and set with 64 GB RAM. The test cases
are validated with an implemented parallel computing mode, which occupies 8 computing cores with 12 workers assigned and takes up 50GB of RAM. The time-domain
dynamic study is implemented in the simulation tool CPAT [145] with the platform
of Cygwin for providing Unix-based environment. For each hypothesized scenario,
the total simulation time is set as 10 seconds and the time settings of the outages
caused by hypothetical switching attacks are assigned at the moment of t=1.0s. The
thresholds of protective relays are set referring to the operating guides [148].

This simulation study would investigate the R̂-k contingency with N set to 3, which
includes top three digital relays with highest impacts on the system based on the fundamentals and applications in the Table 3.2. For each substation, the bus differential
relay is assumed to be able to cause the most severe outage and ranked as level 1;
generator protection relay is ranked to level 2; rank 3 includes the feeder protection
relay; the distance protection relay is ranked to level 4. The double-circuit model is
employed on each transmission line. Compromising single distance protection relay
is assumed to increase the impedance of the transmission line, instead of removing
the branch from the system.
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(b) Dynamic results when compromising bus differential, generation,
and distance protection relays on the substations 5, 3, and 9

(a) Dynamic results when compromising the feeder
protection relays on the substations 2, 3, and 9
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Figure 3.39: Dynamic simulation results of loads, bus voltages, and the
system frequency

3.6.5.2

Steady-State and Dynamic Simulation Verification Study

The verification study on the outages caused by switching attacks between the steadystate and dynamic simulation results have been investigated via the IEEE 14-bus
system. The Table 3.6 records the evaluation results in both static and dynamic
simulations.
Table 3.6
Steady-state and dynamic evaluation verification using IEEE 14-bus system

Steady-State Analysis

Total #.

Converged cases

3,412

PFf ailed

1,113
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Dynamic Analysis
Stable cases
DYf ailed
Stable cases
DYf ailed

Total #.
3,141
271
175
938

The steady-state analysis and the dynamic analysis do not always show the same conclusion in terms of the loss of electricity. The steady-state analysis is more likely to
show optimistic results compared to the dynamic analysis especially when the significant imbalance between generations and loads occurs in the case of R̂-k contingencies.
On the other hand, this analysis is more likely to show pessimistic results especially
when the significant voltage drop such as the low bus voltage below 0.6 p.u. occurs in
the case of R̂-k contingencies. Such discrepancies come from the following limitations
of the static approach: 1) Dynamic constraints and constraints for dynamic change
are skipped, 2) Self-regulated controls and protections are skipped. Because the voltage change and frequency change can happen at the same time, the steady-state
analysis can show both optimistic and pessimistic aspects compared to the dynamic
analysis depending on which aforementioned two factors are more correlated.

For example, Fig. 3.39a depicts the behaviors of the active loads, bus voltages,
and the system frequency of a R̂-3 contingency, where the feeder protection relays
on the buses 2, 3, and 13 have been compromised. It is observed that over 49%
of the active power has been disconnected at t = 1.0s when the system frequency
starts to increase. The generators 1 and 2 are disconnected from the system by the
overfrequency relays at t=2.33s, which would result in the whole system collapse. It
is noted that the steady-state analysis treated as the converged case because the loss
of generation is promptly compensated by another generator, which is impractical
for the real network. Additionally, Fig. 3.39b shows the same quantities where the
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bus differential relay, generation protection relay, and distance protection relays on
the substations 5, 3, and 9 are compromised. The extremely low bus voltages have
been observed following the contingency and self-regulation of loads, i.e. partial
disconnection of loads contributes to recover the voltage. It is noted that the steadystate analysis treat it as the diverged case because such dynamic behavior of the load
(reduction) cannot be represented.

As described in Table 3.6, 4,525 cases are evaluated in both steady-state and dynamic
analysis. PFf ailed and DYf ailed record the nonconverged and blackout cases in static
and dynamic methods correspondingly. It is noticed that the original result counts
4,236 cases as the converged scenarios; however, the static evaluation incorporates
the basic power flow evaluation which hypothesizes that the generator nodes can be
adjusted to absorb imbalance between the generator outputs and the system loads.
If the limit of the generator capacity is fixed in the simulation, more cases would be
counted as diverged case. Thus, the number would be modified to 3,412 and 3,141 out
of 3412 cases are validated as the stable cases. It is counted that 938 out of 1,113 cases
are verified as the blackout cases through the dynamic analysis. Generally, the ratio
of the match between the static and dynamic results is (3141 + 938)/(3412 + 1113) =
90.14%. Specifically, it is counted that the sum of the stable cases is 3141+175 = 3316.
The steady-state analysis identifies 3,141 out of 3,316 cases, which gives the coverage
ratio of 94.72%. Based on these results, it is reasonable to conclude that the steadystate analysis would be considered as acceptable in the following sections.
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Compared with steady-state analysis, the dynamic analysis would include more dynamic details and would cost more time. The average computing speed for dynamic
simulation is around 10 cases per minute and the total computing time for completing 4,525 cases costs several hours with over tens of gigabytes of numerical data
produced. It is reasonable to conclude that the steady-state evaluation would be a
feasible method to conduct a prescreening study in terms of the verification ratio and
the efficient storage.

3.6.5.3

Static Study on the Prescreening of the Protective Relaying Outages

This section conducts the prescreening process by investigating the impacts based
on enumeration of hypothetical switching attacks via presumably compromised relay
outages based on the static evaluations. The comparison study between the results
with and without overloading implications are summarized in the Table 3.7.

As summarized in the Table 3.7, IEEE 30-, 57-, and 118-bus cases evaluate 72, 129,
and 327 protective relays, which, respectively, generate 62,268, 357,899, and 5,827,903
cases in total. It is observed that with the overload implications, the number of evaluated cases are reduced as the level k increases. For example, in the IEEE 30-bus
system, the number of evaluated cases without overloading settings is 55,755 and
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Table 3.7
The steady-state evaluations of identification of critical protective relays

No overloading
k=1
k=2
k=3
With overloading
k=1
k=2
k=3
No overloading
k=1
k=2
k=3
With overloading
k=1
k=2
k=3
No overloading
k=1
k=2
k=3
With overloading
k=1
k=2
k=3

IEEE 30-bus system
Reduced cases Evaluated
72
141
2,415
6,372
53,268
Reduced cases Evaluated
72
345
2,211
13,990
45,650
IEEE 57-bus system
Reduced cases Evaluated
129
381
7,875
35,522
313,982
Reduced cases Evaluated
129
2,370
5,886
144,769
204,735
118-bus system
Reduced cases Evaluated
327
3,215
50,086
35,522
5,738,753
Reduced cases Evaluated
327
11,685
41,616
1,810,096
3,964,179

cases

cases

cases

cases

cases

cases

Critical #.
2
23
40
Critical #.
5
37
95
Critical #.
3
98
612
Critical #.
20
51
475
Critical #.
10
88
268
Critical #.
38
61
839

it drops to 47,993 with the overload implication, which reduces 12.46% of combinations in total. For 57- and 118-bus systems, the reduced rate is 31.08% and 30.59%,
respectively.

Specifically, in the IEEE 57-bus system, it is observed that if the bus differential
relay on the substation 22 has been compromised, the simulation would agree with a
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Figure 3.40: Risk index of the protective relays in the IEEE test systems
with 14, 30, 57, and 118 bus nodes: (a) IEEE 14-bus system; (b) IEEE
30-bus system; (c) IEEE 57-bus system; and, (d) IEEE 118-bus system.

diverged solution. Similarly, R̂-2 contingency evaluation also reveals that when the
bus differential relays on the substation 1 and the generator protection relay on the
substation 3 are compromised simultaneously, the system would not be stable in the
static analysis.

In a larger system, i.e., IEEE 118-bus system, the R̂-1 contingency suggests that
when the bus differential relay on the substation 8 has been compromised, which
disconnects 28 MW of load and transmission line 8-5 and line 8-9, the system would
not be stable. The R̂-2 contingency analysis reveals another worst case that the when
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the bus differential relay on the bus 37 and the generator protection relay on the bus
10 are compromised, 450 MW of power and the transmission lines 35-37, 37-38, 37-39,
and 37-40 are disconnected from the system. Similarly, the R̂-3 contingency records
another worst case that when the generator protection relays on the bus 10, 12, and 69
are compromised, the system would lose 1051.4 MW of power source and the system
would not be stable.

To quantify the impact level of the protective relays at each substation using the
results of critical protective relays, Figs. 3.40(a), 3.40(b), 3.40(c), and 3.40(d) depict
the risk index for IEEE 14-, 30-, 57-, and 118-bus systems. It is worth noting that the
risk index is derived from the results without overloading implication. 4 different relay
ranks are included in each figure to classify the critical relays. The legends of relay 1,
2, 3, and 4 denote the relay with the first, second, third, and forth rank, which denotes
the bus differential, generator protection, feeder protection, and distance protection
relay, respectively. The bus differential, generator, and feeder protection relays are
selected as the first three relays that would lead to the most severe outages. It is
also noticed that the generator protection relays may not be necessarily deployed
because the some substations might not be connected with generation units, then the
alternative distance relay is included in the evaluation.

In the IEEE 14-bus system, as depicted in the Fig. 3.40(a), it is observed that
the bus differential relay on the substation 5 acquires the highest risk index with
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0.5952. The highest risk index of the generation protection relay and distance relay
is 0.1142 and 0.1107. Compared with the risk index level of bus differential and
generator protection relay, the feeder protection relay is lower than 0.05. Though the
distance relay would produce a relatively lower index, it is unwise to underestimate
its impact. For example, when the bus differential relay on the substation 5 has been
compromised, which would disconnect 18.8 MW of load and the multiple transmission
lines, including line 1-5, 2-5, 4-5, 5-6, 6-11, 6-12, and 6-13, the simulation would agree
with a converged solution. But when combining the contingency that compromising
the single distance relay on the buses 14, which would increase the impedance of the
lines 13-14 and 9-14, the power flow calculation fails to converge.

In the IEEE 30-bus system, as depicted in the Fig. 3.40(b), 2 critical bus differential
relays are identified in the R̂-1 contingency analysis, which are on the substations
20 and 22. The second critical bus differential relay, which is on the substation 6,
acquires the value of 0.3358. The generator protection relay acquires the highest index
of 0.0308 on the substations 17, 18, and 22. The distance protection relay acquires
the highest index of 0.1846 on the substation 6. It is also noticed that no critical
feeder protection relay is detected in the system. In the IEEE 57-bus system, as
shown in the Fig. 3.40(c), it is observed that bus differential relays on the substation
22, 28, and 31 are identified as critical relays, which acquire the risk index of 1.0.
Other differential relays acquire comparably lower risk which are less than 0.2. The
generation protection relay on the substation 8 acquires the highest index of 0.1585
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in the second rank. Both distance and feeder protection relays demonstrate relatively
low risk indices in the results. Similarly, in the IEEE 118-bus system, as displayed in
the Fig. 3.40(d), the differential relays on the substations 5, 8, 11, 59, 61, 63, 76, 77,
and 101 are identified as critical in the R̂-1 contingency analysis. It is noticed that the
vertical coordinate has been re-scaled to 0.3 to increase the readability of the figure.
The generator protection relay on the substation 61 acquires the highest risk index
of 0.2131. Compared with the differential and generator protection relays, it is found
that most of the feeder and distance protection relays obtain lower impact level. In the
prescreening process, it is also observed that the risk index not only include the impact
level of the critical digital relays but also incorporates the potential vulnerability of the
substation. For example, both the differential and generator protection relays on the
substation 61 obtain relatively higher indices than other substations, it is reasonable
to conduct a detailed investigation on the security of the protection parameter of the
substation.
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Chapter 4

Cyber Risk Management:
Insurance Premium for Power
Grids

4.1

Introduction

This chapter proposes a framework for grid insurance against disruptive switching
attacks, which is assumed to be determined by two major aspects: (1) the probability
of successful intrusion into the substation(s) which will presumably result in disruptive
switching attack from the compromised substation(s) and (2) the discrete distribution
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of claim size of each potential attack scenario [64, 65, 66]. The vulnerability and the
steady-state probability of potential electronic intrusion to each power substation
have been studied in the papers [67, 68], which are derived from the firewall and
password models using Markov chain. The steady-state probability [67] is assumed
to be effective to generate the discrete distribution of the hypothesized scenario.
The proposed claim size of power utilities is assumed to be equal to the estimated
economic loss that is directly related to substation outages. To address the impact
of the hypothesized cyberattacks, following assumptions are included in the proposed
framework:

† The risk index studies [1, 25, 30, 45], using the extended combination method
and reverse pyramid model (RPM), generate the risk-based “bottleneck list.”
The “critical” combinations would lead to the potential instability of the power
system in steady-state analysis [45].
† the surveys on the operational loss [149, 150, 151] and the electricity prices [152,
153] are included in the paper to conduct a comparative study of the economic
loss of the hypothesized power outages. It is assumed that the operational
loss discussed in the paper only covers the direct loss that has been studied in
[149, 150, 151].
† The studies on the mean time to restore power (MTTRP) [154, 155, 156] of
the hypothesized power system outages are also performed, which estimate the
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expected restoring time of a system after a presumed cyberattack.

In general, the insurance claim has the specific verbatim emphasizing on cyberphysical switching attacks that are directly initiated by the control systems from
substations or control centers. Any other security threats that do not immediately
cause operational impacts [157, 158] are not included in this premium model.

4.2

Probability distribution based on CyberReliability Assessment Model

4.2.1

Probability Mass Distribution of the Hypothesized
Scenario

The vulnerability of the control networks has been evaluated by modeling intrusions
and consequences of a cyberattack on control networks [67, 68]. The embedded connectivity of the firewall and password models can be formulated using a cyber-net
diagram. Such connectivity generates a transition probability matrix M that satisfies:

π̃ ⋅ M = π̃
(4.1)
∑ π̃ = 1
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where π̃ denotes the steady-state probability of state in the embedded transition
matrix of the Markov chain M. The steady-state probability π can be calculated
by weighting each element in π̃ with its costed sojourn time of the corresponding
markings [67]:

⎧
⎪
τ̄s (Ms )
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪ τ̄c (Mj )
π(⋅) = ⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
0
⎪
⎩

Ms ∈ T

(4.2)

Mj ∈ V

where T and V are the marking sets for immediate and timed transitions [67], respectively. The mean time that a process transits from state Ms to Mj are given as τ̄s .
The time spent in the state Mj is denoted as τ̄c . s and j denote the different positions
in the Markov chain M. The steady-state probability derived from Eqs. 4.1 and 4.2
is employed in this framework. Such probability not only embeds vulnerability of the
protective models, i.e., the firewall and password models, but also incorporates the
topology of protective networks contained in the substation.

Assume that the system contains S substations. Let T be the collection of all nonempty subsets of S = {1, 2, ⋯, S}. This definition lets the set T consist of all kcombinations of S with k = 1, ⋯, S. Let the t-th element of T be t ⊆ S. The probability
of the t-th substation combination p̃x is defined as:

p˜x (t) = (∏ π(i)) ( ∏ (1 − π(j)))
i∈t

(4.3)

j∈S,j∉t

where i and j in the Eq. 4.3 denote the indices of substations and the subscript x
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denotes the claim size of the t-th substation combination.

It is worth noting that we exclude the empty set in T, which corresponds to the case
without insurance claims. For this reason, the cardinality ∣T∣ of set T is equal to
2S − 1, and the sum of the probability p̃x calculated in Eq. 4.3 may not necessarily be
equal to 1. As a consequence, the probability mass function of the discrete substation
combination can be normalized that will be summed up to 1.0:

px (t) =

p̃x (t)

∣T∣

∑t p̃x (t)

(4.4)

Eq. 4.4 formulates the basic discrete probability distribution of hypothesized substation outages. px (t) is the function of t in which it cannot be directly applied to the
premium calculations because the different substation outages could claim the same
size of economic loss. The following section would further illustrate the formulation
of the claim size and the necessary modifications to Eq. 4.4.

4.2.2

The Claim Size of the Hypothesized Substation Outages

Determining the claim size due to the hypothesized substation outage is important for
insurance companies to implement their insurance policy because of the direct effect
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on their own business strategy. In the following formulation, the data is obtained
from the previous cyber-based contingency analysis in the steady-state studies [1,
25, 30, 45] and the claim size x is assumed to be equal to the direct loss due to the
hypothesized power outages, which is determined by three variables: (1) the power
loss PL (MW) due to the substation outages in steady-state evaluation [1, 25, 30, 45],
(2) the expected mean time to restore power H (hour) from the abnormal status to
normal steady-state conditions [154, 155, 156], and (3) the direct costs γ ($/MWh)
during the power outages [149, 150, 151]. Thus, the claim size x ($) for the t-th
substation combination is defined as:

xt = PLt ⋅ Ht ⋅ γ

(4.5)

Fig. 3.3 depicts the flowchart of an enumerative algorithm for calculating the claim
size based on Eq. 4.5. The “critical” lists C is generated using the extended enumeration model in [45]. The “critical” combination of substation(s) recorded in C
may cause the system steady-state instability, which is considered as the blackout
situation in this formulation. The critical list C is applied here to identify the size
of blackouts of the substations combination set t ∈ T. The MTTRP simulation is
conducted based on the concept of generic restoration milestones (GRMs) [154]. The
italic form of M T T RP represents the vector that records the restoration time of each
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START
Initialize the critical
list of the system C
Input the direct costs γ due
to the power outages
Complete the MTTRP simulation
Obtain the restoring time for the system L;
MTTRP is saved as the input of the
restoring time for all substations
Get the substation set t in T

Does the set t contain the
critical combination in C?
No

Yes

System is in brownout
let H = max{ MTTRP(i), i in t }

System is in an hypothesized
blackout and set H = L

Obtain the power loss PL due to the
substation outage
Calculate the claim size:
xt = PL × H × γ
No

End of T?
Yes

Modify the probability mass function px by summing all the
probability px(t) which has the same claim size x
END

Figure 4.1: Algorithm for enumerative calculations of the claim size x

substation and L is the total restoration time initiated from the blackstart (BS). It
is observed that, after all the claim sizes in T have been identified, the different combination sets t1 and t2 may have the different px (t1 ) and px (t2 ) but share the same
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claim size xi . In order to create the probability mass function of the claim size x,
which the cyber insurance company focuses on, the probability distribution function
determined in the formula 4.4 needs to be modified by aggregating all px (ti ) that
have the same claim size:
∣T∣

p(x) = ∑ px (t)

(4.6)

t

Eq. 4.6 formulates the PMF of the diverse claim sizes x and the variable t has been
canceled out. Compared with Eq. 4.4, Eq. 4.6 is more clear and convenient to be
applied in the ruin probability calculations to determine the insurance premium.

4.3

Determination of Cyber Insurance Premium
using Ruin Probability Theory

4.3.1

Ruin Probability Calculation

Ruin probabilities has been widely implemented since the beginning of last century
and has demonstrated its effectiveness in evaluating the long-run viability of insurance portfolios [64, 65, 66]. The primary purpose of using Ruin is to estimate the
probability that the total claims exceed the sum of the initial risk reserve of a utility and the total premium received in a given time interval. To avoid the ruin of a
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company to the greatest extent, the total premium should be able to bound the ruin
probability in a significantly small level [65].

The ruin probability ψ(u) for the initial risk reserve u is fundamentally defined in
[64] as :
ψ(u) = P r{M > u} = 1 − FM (u)

(4.7)

where M is defined as the maximal aggregate loss and M = L1 +L2 +L3 +⋯+LN . P r{A}
denotes the probability that the event A happens, and FX (x) = P r{X ≤ x} represents
the cumulative density function (CDF) of X. It is assumed that the number of claims
N follows a geometric distribution satisfying

P r{N = n} = (1 − q)q n ,

n = 0, 1, 2, ⋯

(4.8)

where 0 < q < 1. Each random variable Ln represents claimed loss. Assume that for
any fixed N , the amounts of the successive claims, denoted as L1 , ⋯, LN , are positive,
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with a common CDF FL (x) with
mean µ. Ln is assumed to be i.i.d. with the probability density function of given as:

fL (x) =

1 − FL (x)
,
µ
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x > 0.

(4.9)

As a result, the CDF of the random sum M is derived as
∞

n+1

n=0

k=1

FM (u) = ∑ P r { ∑ Lk ≤ u} P r{N = n}

(4.10)

Eq. 4.10 is known as the distribution function of the compound geometric distribution. If we assume that M is defined on non-negative integers, the recursive formula
for the CDF of M is shown as [64]:

FM (u) =

x
1
θ
+
∑ fL (y)FM (u − y)
1 + θ − fL (0) 1 + θ − fL (0) y=1

(4.11)

In order to use the recursive formula in Eq. 4.11, fL (x) need to be discretized.
The discrete distribution {fx ∶ x = 0, 1, 2, ...} is utilized to replace the continuous
distribution fL (x) at points 0, h, 2h⋯ by matching a certain number of moments. As
a consequence, within each incremental interval, a certain number of local and global
moments of fx and fL (x) are equal. The number of moments which are required for
replacement is usually the same as the number of intervals. Combining Eqs. 4.7 and
4.11, the probability of ruin can be derived:

ψ(u) =

x
1 − Fu
1
−
⋅ ∑ fy ⋅ ψ(u − y)
1 + θ − f0 1 + θ − f0 y=1

(4.12)

where Fu = f0 + f1 + ⋯ + fu and θ ∈ (0, 1) is a user-defined variable, which needs to
be adjusted by an insurance company. Eq. 4.12 is employed in the whole framework
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presented in the paper for the probability of ruin.

It is observed that the claim size x is discrete and may not be necessarily starting
from 0. Assume the system contains the claim size x that satisfies x ∈ [a, b], where a
and b are the lower and upper bounds of the claim size, respectively. Consider it is a
two-moment problem, the following linear system is verified:
⎡
⎢
⎢1
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢a
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢a
⎢
⎣

1
a+h
2

(a + h)

⎤ ⎡
⎤ ⎡
⎤
⎥ ⎢
⎥ ⎢ b
⎥
⎥
⎢
⎥
⎢
1 ⎥ ⎢ fa ⎥ ⎢ ∫a fL (x)dx ⎥⎥
⎥
⎥ ⎢
⎥ ⎢
⎥ ⎢
⎥ ⎢ b
⎥
⎥
⎢
⎥
⎢
⋅
=
b ⎥ ⎢fa+h ⎥ ⎢ ∫a xfL (x)dx ⎥⎥
⎥ ⎢
⎥ ⎢
⎥
⎥ ⎢
⎥
⎥ ⎢
⎥
⎥ ⎢
⎥ ⎢ b
⎥
⎢
⎥
⎢
2
2
b ⎥ ⎢ fb ⎥ ⎢∫a x fL (x)dx⎥⎥
⎦ ⎣
⎦ ⎣
⎦

(4.13)

The right-hand-side values of Eq. 4.13 are called the r-th moment with the form of
b

r
∫a x fL (x)dx and h denotes the general increment of each moment. These values can

be derived from Eq. 4.9. Combining Eqs. 4.9, 4.12 and 4.13, the ruin probability can
be solved with the predetermined parameter θ.

4.3.2

Premium Calculation Using Ruin Probability Theory

Based on the details of ruin probability calculation clarified in previous section, the
tentative premium amount, I, is defined:
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I = (1 + θf )λµ

(4.14)

where θf is the feasible θ that can be identified in the ruin probability calculation. λ
denotes the expected number of claims of the process and can be obtained by using
Eq. 4.3. Compared with the traditional insurance policy, the frequency of claims for
the cyber insurance on the power system outage may be much less because of its low
occurrence in the historical data. µ is the mean of the successive claims that can be
derived through Eqs. 4.4 and 4.9. Additionally, θf may not be unique if the insurance
company provides an acceptable range of ruin probabilities, which would affect the
range of θ and the feasible premium amount. In chapter 4.4, we provide a list of the
feasible ruin probabilities with different choices of θ’s and different settings of initial
reserve u.
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Figure 4.2: The summary of steady-state probability and the expected
mean time to restore power for IEEE test cases

4.4

4.4.1

Numerical Illustration

Test Case setup: Steady-state Probability, MTTRP,
and Claim Size

4.4.1.1

Steady-state probability

The case setup of the steady-state probability is derived from the intrusion probabilities of “Model 1” and “Model 3” from “outside” attack in [67], denoted as π1 and π3 ,
respectively. Notice that π1 ∈ Π1 and π3 ∈ Π3 , where Π1 and Π3 are two probability
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pools for different models. In order to improve the feasibility of the model, the authors assume that the substations with generation units installed are deployed with
more secure protective parameters, which would lead to a lower intrusion probability.
Fig. 4.2 gives the detailed settings of the steady-state probability for each system,
highlighted in light blue and based on the left-side axis. It is observed that in the
IEEE 14-bus system (10 substations), substations 1 and 2 are equipped with generators which are in lower probabilities of being compromised, i.e., π(1) = 0.00034856
and π(2) = 0.00038848. In the IEEE 30-bus system (24 substations), substations 1,
2, 4, 17, 18 and 22 are connected with generation unit, which would be assigned with
lower probabilities. Similarly, substations 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9 and 12 in the IEEE 57-bus
system are with lower probabilities of successful intrusion.

4.4.1.2

Critical list of hypothesized substation outages

The critical list C is derived using the extended RPM model [45], which enumerates all
the hypothesized substation combinations, and the “worst” combinations are identified. In the 14-bus system, 3 “critical” substations are identified, which are substation
2, 4 and 5. 8 substations are found to be critical in the 30-bus system, which are
substation 2, 4, 5, 6, 10, 17, 20 and 22. Similarly, in the 57- and the 118-bus system,
18 and 42 “critical” substations are found, which may lead the system to potential
instability in terms of steady-state analysis. Based on the critical list, the complete
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combination list T would be determined to identify the hypothesized power outages.
It is noticed that even though the critical lists could generate numerous combinations
as much as possible; however, in the proposed premium calculation study, the depth
k is determined as k = 3. It is observed that the steady-state probabilities of the
combinations at the 4th or higher order would be less than 10−12 and is considered as
the small probability event which would not be included in this study.

4.4.1.3

Simulation results of expected mean time to restore power
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Figure 4.3: The direct operational loss due to power outages with different
systems and diverse γ settings

The simulations of expected mean time to restore power (MTTRP) for different systems are derived based on the GRM models [154]. In the IEEE 14-bus system, the
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bus 2 is selected as BS node. For other generation substation, i.e., substation 1,
the setting of the time to crank the generator is 80 minutes. The lumped load at
substation 1 is selected as the critical load. For both 30- and 57-bus systems, node
1 is selected as the BS nodes and node 7 is selected as the BS node in the 118-bus
system. The time to crank generator is selected within [80,120] minutes. The “pick
up” time of transformers and transmission lines are applied with the default settings
of 5 minutes. MTTRP simulations demonstrate that it takes 3, 6, 3 and 8 steps to
restore 14-, 30-, 57-, and 118-bus systems respectively, which cost 118, 404, 373, and
414 minutes in total. In the Fig. 4.2, the expected restoration time H of each system
is marked in red.

In this simulation, the direct operational costs γ ($/MWh) caused by the hypothesized
substation outage are extracted from four different studies: 1) the studies on value
of loss load (VOLL) [150, 151]; 2) the surveys on the estimated direct costs in the
previous power outage [149]; 3) the statistical studies of the average retail electricity
price [152]; and 4) the basic local marginal price (LMP) from the optimal power flow
(OPF) solution [147]. Based on the results of the contingency analysis C and the
MTTRP simulations, the operational loss of the each substation outage, denoted as
Γ1−4 , for these four cases with different settings of costs γ1−4 , are given in Fig. 4.3.
To improve the readability of the figure, the authors re-scale the unit for each case
and specify the amount of the dollars per unit in legends.
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4.4.2

Numerical Results of Ruin Probability and Premium
Amount
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Figure 4.4: The PMF of test cases with diverse settings of γ

Figure. 4.2 presents the distribution function of steady-state probability of substation intrusions and the expected MTTRP for each substation under hypothesized
cyberattack. Combining Eqs. 4.9, 4.12 and 4.14 with the diverse settings of direct
operational loss, i.e., Γ1−4 , as displayed in Fig. 4.3, this section would provide the
numerical results of ruin probability and the corresponding premiums.

According to Eqs. 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6, the distributions of PMF for all test cases are
given in Fig. 4.4. It is worth noting that cases 1, 2, 3 and 4 denote the test cases
with diverse settings of direct operational loss with the corresponding Γ1−4 .

In the IEEE 14-bus system, the sample size of the discrete variable L is 29. For
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different settings of γ, X1,2,3,4 are within the thresholds of [$38,743, $14,834,302],
[$4,164, $1,594,566], [$813, $311,665] and [$246, $94,224], respectively. It is noticed
that the diverse settings of γ would not change the bound of the PMF, p(x), which
is [0.000026246, 0.2875]. In Fig. 4.4, the first 100 samples are displayed for the
PMF’s of the 30-, 57- and 118-bus systems. The sample size of discrete variable
X in the 30-bus system is 572, where X1,2,3,4 would locate in the intervals [$1,227,
$15,682,970], [$131, $1,685,791], [$930, $329,495] and [$27, $9,677], respectively. The
upper and lower bounds of the PMF are 0.1028 and 4.4912×10−9 , respectively. In
the 57-bus system, the sample size of variable X is 1,861. The feasible intervals
of discrete variables X1,2,3,4 are [$21,490, $64,279,598], [$2,310, $6,909,534], [$452,
$1,350,500] and [$146, $435,919], respectively. The bounds of the PMF for this system is [1.5139×10−9 , 0.09925]. Similarly, as for the 118-bus system, there are 3,463
different samples and the corresponding discrete variables X1,2,3,4 are in the intervals [$98,171, $431,905,449], [$10,553, $46,426,319], [$2,063, $9,074,235] and [$630,
$2,770,175], respectively. The upper and lower bounds of the PMF for this system
are 0.05104 and 8.6668 × 10−8 , respectively. It is observed that thresholds of the PMF
gradually decrease with the increasing sample sizes, constrained to ∑ p(x) = 1.

By combining Eqs. 4.9, 4.12 and 4.13 with the PMF depicted in Fig. 4.4, the results
of ruin probability and the corresponding feasible premium amounts are summarized
in Table 4.1. In the table, θ is selected from 0 to 1 with the increment of 0.2. The
initial reserve u are selected among 0, 10 and 100, which, refer to Eq. 4.12, would
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determine the recursive level for calculating the ruin probability ψ. It is observed
that, when u is 0, Eq. 4.12 could be written as ψ(0) = (1 − f0 )/(1 + θ − f0 ), which only
involves the first iteration. In the row of “System constants,” parameter λ denotes the
frequency of the claim that have been formulated through Eq. 4.3, which is 0.0067,
0.0157, 0.0289, and 0.0724 in the 14-, 30-, 57-, and 118-bus systems, respectively.
It is observed that in Eq. 4.12, variable h denotes the general increment for each
global moment, here the authors consider the formulation of the proposed problem
as a two-moment process which would optimally cover the whole interval of the claim
size. It indicates that each interval would cover half of the claim size. To distinguish
the general increment h, h′ is introduced as the proportion of the coverage.

From Table 4.1, among all the test systems, ψ(0) is always larger than 0.4. It might
be “too risky” and may not be an acceptable probability. Additionally, it is found that
the ruin probability ψ(u) in each case would be decreasing with θ increased, which
coincides with Eq. 4.12. Consider ψ(0)′ with a larger θ′ and ψ(0)′′ with a smaller θ′′ ,
it can be calculated that for the first ruin probability, it holds: ψ(0)′ < ψ(0)′′ . Since
the ψ(u) is calculated recursively based on the first item ψ(0), then the probability
of ψ(u)′ with a larger θ would be eventually smaller than ψ(u)′′ . Therefore, ψ(u)
is a decreasing function as θ increases. For this reason, the authors are able to
give a reasonable guess of certain ruin probability even without a predetermined
value of θ. Take the calculation results of IEEE 30-bus system as an example, even
though the ruin probability ψ(10) under the condition of θ = 0.9 is not provided, it
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is reasonable to conclude that the probability ψ(10) would locate the interval [1.029
×10−4 , 1.094×10−4 ], which are the lower and upper bounds of the probability detailed
in the table when θ = 0.8 and 1.0.

According to Eq. 4.14, Table 4.1 also provides the feasible premium amounts for each
IEEE test system with different settings of γ, where θf is assumed to be 0.8. In a
more general case, for example, if the insurance company would be able to accept
the ruin probability that less than 5.0 ×10−4 for the 57-bus system, and if the initial
reserve is 10 for the costs settings of γ1 , the feasible set of θ can be determined from
the table as [0.6, 1.0]. Based on Eq. 4.14, the feasible premium interval [Il , Iu ] could
be determined as [$919,945, $1,149,931], where Il and Iu denote the lower and upper
bound of the premium I accordingly. Similarly, in the 118-bus system with the initial
reserve of 100, if the acceptable range of the ruin probability is less than 2.0×10−4 and
the operational costs are set as γ2 , the tentative range of the θ can be approximately
identified to be [0.5, 1.0]. The feasible premium amount I is determined with the
lower bound of $ 1,622,810 and the upper bound of $2,163,746.
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1.500×10−4
1.350×10−4
1.227×10−4
1.125×10−4
0.0157
50%
3,166,400
$340,360
$66,525
$1,954
894,826
9,619
1,880
55

57-bus
u
θ
0.2
0.4
0
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.2
0.4
10
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.2
0.4
100
0.6
0.8
1.0
λ
Const.
h′
1
2
µ($)
3
4
1
2
I($)
3
4

system
Ruin Prob.
7.965×10−1
6.618×10−1
5.660×10−1
4.945×10−1
4.390×10−1
2.076×10−2
2.868×10−3
4.925×10−4
9.674×10−5
2.061×10−5
2.779×10−6
1.806×10−6
1.597×10−6
1.461×10−6
1.347×10−6
0.0289
50%
19,895,000
2,138,600
418,000
$134,920
1,034,938
11,250
21,744
7,019

118-bus
u
θ
0.2
0.4
0
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.2
0.4
10
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.2
0.4
100
0.6
0.8
1.0
λ
Const.
h′
1
2
µ($)
3
4
1
2
I($)
3
4

Table 4.1 The results of ruin probability and feasible premium policy

system
Ruin Prob.
8.802×10−1
6.706×10−1
5.758×10−1
5.044×10−1
4.488×10−1
3.023×10−4
2.248×10−4
1.906×10−4
1.665×10−4
1.571×10−4
2.294×10−4
2.068×10−4
1.882×10−4
1.727×10−4
1.596×10−4
0.0724
50%
139,010,000
14,943,000
$2,920,600
891,590
18,115,783
1,947,372
380,613
11,6192

Chapter 5

Conclusion

Improving the cyber-situation awareness of the control centers throughout an interconnection can be challenging. Emerging, renewable energy sources increase the
uncertainty of entire power networks, as well as local networks. This uncertainty
raises the possibility of unexpected incidents in future networks. The cybersecurity
of a power grid is also a topic of research that enables asset owners to anticipate
cascading failure as well as identify interdependencies due to cyber-related initiating
events. We are in an era where intelligent cyberattackers are emerging with the crossdomain knowledge to execute an attack plan against power grids. In such attacks,
attackers may not have enough or complete information about the grid to assure the
success of their attack plan. Defenders can reduce risks to power infrastructure with
improved security analytics in order to anticipate attacks with serious consequences,
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and thus strategically deploy additional security protections to critical substations
and components.

The dissertation starts to review the cyber-related contingency analysis and summarizes the steady-state and dynamic stability concerns of the contingency. The
following chapters then introduce a cyber-risk assessment model, which includes the
implementation of derived metrics on combinations of hypothesized outages with verification of steady-state and dynamic system simulations. The reduction of permutations and combinations of the hypothesized scenarios can be explored to determine
its practicality and systemic bottleneck assessment in order to identify the pivotal
components/substations of a power grid. The preliminary cyber insurance premium
model has also been demonstrated in the dissertation, which reveals that understanding the impact of a cyberattack event is significant for developing a feasible cyber risk
coverage solution.

5.1

Cyber-Risk Assessment Framework

This work extends the previous RPM model by incorporating enumerative combinations to quantify cyber-based contingencies with hypothesized substation outages and
incurred overloads. The evaluation is proceeded to ensure the coverage of all critical
“worst-case” substations combinations are identified at each level k and the subsets of
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nonconvergent substations combinations are excluded for k-1 level to avoid the explosion of combinations, which is also defined as S-k contingency. The validation of its
application has been greatly extended by incorporating steady-state load flow evaluation. The consideration of islanding formations after presumption of hypothesized
substation attacks are also modeled in this study. A comparable analysis towards
the simulation performance in between serial and parallel computing modes has been
established based on a platform of the superior computing cluster. This research
also provides two aspects to decompose combinatorial evaluation with a curve fitting
function to estimate time with respect to the available computing resources as well
as utilization of computing memory to speed up, which may prove the feasibility of
future implementation and estimate the ballpark number of how much time it would
take for a larger system.

In order to improve the feasibility of the cyber-risk assessment model, evaluating the
impact of the critical protective relay(s) is required to be included, which is defined
as R-k contingency. This research verifies the computational outcomes of disruptive
switching attacks and combinations using the power flow and time-domain dynamic
simulations. The consistency of the results between the dynamic and static studies has
been exhibited in the study. It is observed that the time-domain simulation provides
more details of the behaviors on the relays based on the initial event (hypothetical
switching attack scenarios through digital relays). Compared with the dynamic simulation, the computation of power flow studies (steady-state analysis) takes less time
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and computing resources. Hence, this reliably serves as a means to pre-screen larger
combinations. The results also demonstrate promising outcomes and can be further
explored for online applications to identify the critical protective relays.

The “routable” keyword in the latest NERC CIP compliance implies the limitation
of firewalls. This proposed model would be a tremendous interest from a perspective
of asset owners where they can identify pivotal substations/relays as suggested in
this cyber-induced contingency analysis that might initiate cascading failure. They
could then thwart electronic intrusion by deploying unidirectional gateway while not
compromising data exchange between the substations and control center. This would
eliminate the possibilities of cyberintrusion from outsides. This method can also help
to prioritize their investment according to the substation criticality, based on the
annual budget they could expense each year.

5.2

Cyber Insurance Premium Framework

The insurance would serve as an effective incentive to improve the cybersecurity parameters of the utilities’ infrastructures or devices. The cyber insurance market for
power grids remains in an emerging stage and it is yet to mature. Based on the previous risk-assessment model, the preliminary establishment of cyber insurance premium
using IEEE test cases has demonstrated the promise of actuary and its correlation
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to the potential problematic combinations of disruptive switching cyberattacks. The
studies provide the simulation results of steady-state probability and its distribution
function, the expected mean time to recover power (MTTRP) for each substation,
and the diverse settings of estimated operation loss. All factors provided here are the
necessary setups to calculate the ruin probability. The ruin probability is applied in
the study to evaluate the management performance of the insurance company in the
long-term operation. With the detailed and numerous cases provided in the studies,
the insurance companies can formulate the feasible premium amounts based on their
owner-defined conditions and their base cases.

5.3

Future Work

The future research on the cyber-assessement model will incorporate the current
model into the online application of the power system operation, which would include two main functions: (1) online assess and update the cyber reliability of the
system before an attack occurs and (2) restrict the level of physical impact after an
attack occurs. Defenders may not be able to predict the attackers’ behaviors or their
strategies, which would induce coordinating attacks on multiple “weak points” and
lead to cascading failures. Additionally, the independence study on the intrusion
stability in the insurance model would also be investigated in the future work.
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5.3.1

Online Cyber-Risk Assessment with Applications of
Wide-area Protection Schemes

“More and more functions are moved from local and regional control centers toward
the central or national control center [159].” This statement has clarified the major
difference between the wide-area protection schemes and the traditional protection
schemes. The proposed cyber-risk assessment model is implemented on the network
of the wide-area protection scheme. Based on the real-time data, such as inputs of
loads, bus voltages, and power sources, collected from the wide-area measurement
system (WAMS) [159], the cyber-risk assessment model might perform exhaustively
evaluations using both static and dynamic analyses. A reliability-related log file
would be generated with potential critical infrastructures and high risky electrical
devices included. With the given set of time intervals for sampling, operational logs
are collected and analyzed, which can be used to evaluate the performance of the
accuracy and consistency of the wide-area protection scheme based on statistical
studies.
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5.3.2

Cyber Impact Restriction Framework

The proposed online framework would introduce an improved algorithm of k-medoids
clustering/partitioning method using (1) system indicators of electrical quantities
collected from the WAMS and (2) the list of critical infrastructures from the risk
assessment model. Once an attack occurs, compromised infrastructures or electrical
equipment are selected as k center nodes. For each point, the proposed algorithm
would resolve a set of optimization functions and generate a feasible parameter of
outages that would minimize the impact of the attack. The wide-area protection
scheme would then perform the “operation” algorithm and disconnect loads, generators, transmission lines, and transformers as needed to restrict the fault area.

5.3.3

Local Power Restoration with Incorporating Stability
Constraints

It is possible that the results from the previous section may not necessarily be the
optimal solution as the “operation” report may include the potential risky electrical
components that have not been compromised and may not cause cascading failures.
The local power restoration algorithm is implemented in the framework to examine
the performance k-medoids clustering algorithm and pick up local loads/generators
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and reclose circuit breakers to connect transmission lines back to the system with satisfying the constraints of power system transient/steady-state stability. Additionally,
due to stability constraints, the reclosure procedure would further reduce the cyber
impact level by recharging and synchronizing isolated islands.

5.3.4

Improvement on the Cyber Insurance Model with Independence Implications

The future study on the cyber insurance framework will investigate the independence
research. The original PMF introduced in the Chapter 4 needs to be modified by
incorporating: (1) the specific and realistic cyberattack paths through a single or
multiple substations based on the network topology of the system; (2) the historical
and statistical data observed from previous physical blackout/brownout scenarios,
such as N-1, N-2, or N-k contingencies events, to formulate a verified potential dependent connections within certain contingencies events; and (3) the close-connected
relationship among multiple control areas in a large power grid network in terms of
cascading failures.
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